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INTRODUCTION
The subject of "marital property rights" is very timely because
those rights are in a state of transition. The term "marital prop
erty rights" covers a vast multitude of rights or interests con
ferred by law on persons who occupy the status of spouse.
This lecture is divided into four discrete, yet related segments.
The first segment addresses how the law allocates original owner
ship between spouses in a marriage. The second segment turns to
the intestate share of the surviving spouse. This is not a topic
that high-powered estate planners get involved in very much be
cause intestate estates are usually fairly small. But to the surviv-
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ing spouse, the intestate share can mark the difference between
economic security and poverty. The third segment addresses the
rights of spouses upon divorce and disinheritance at death. The
fourth and final segment surveys some recent developments re
garding the rights of persons who are not spouses at all, but
"near-spouses."
The Uniform Probate Code was revised in 1990, and central
parts of those revisions affect spousal rights. The American Col
lege of Trust and Estate Counsel (the "College") was heavily rep
resented in the discussion and final outcome of those revisions,
through its three representatives to the Joint Editorial Board for
the Uniform Probate Code, Chuck Collier, Joe Foster, past presi
dent of the College (who actually joined the Board after the revi
sions were completed), and Ray Young, and its three emeritus
members, past presidents all, Harrison Durand, Harley Spitler,
and of course Joe Straus, former Trachtman lecturer, and the fa
ther of the Code. As a matter of fact, all but one of the members
of the Board are also prominent members of the College though
they officially represent either the American Bar Association or
the Uniform Law Conference. Included in this latter group are a
former president of the College and Trachtman lecturer, Mal
Moore; the current Secretary of the Board of Regents, Jack
Bruce; and two former Trachtman lecturers, Ed Halbach and
John Langbein. The Board's State Courts Liaison, Jim Wade, is a
member of the Board of Regents, and the Board's Executive Di
rector and Chief Reporter of the original UPC, Dick Wellman, is
a well-known Academic Fellow.
In this lecture, I shall be reporting on the UPC revisions re
garding spousal rights. If nothing else, those revisions have al
ready stirred a renewed interest in and debate about spousal
rights, and are likely to continue to do so for years to come.
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I.

ALLOCATION OF ORIGINAL
O W NERSHIP

Family property is like any resource, and spousal rights are just
one characteristic of the allocation of those resources, albeit prob
ably the most important one. So, I start with the question of how
ownership of family property is allocated and distributed. For
the most part, the law defers the distributive decision to the mem
ber of the family who is the so-called owner of the property. The
law, in other words, appears merely to be a facilitator rather than
a direct regulator in this field. When a dispute arises regarding
the distribution of property, the law arbitrates the dispute by ref
erence to the donor's intention. The lawyers among us have all
read hundreds of court opinions containing the stock phrase "the
donor's intention is the polestar of construction."
But the law's deference to the donor's intention somewhat dis
guises the truly important question of who is or can be the donor,
or stated another way, who is the owner of the family property
and hence the person with economic power within the family.
Regarding original ownership (hence economic power) between
spouses, it is the law, not the donor, that makes the crucial alloca
tive decision. Although the law makes this allocative decision,
the law throughout the world and, indeed, within the United
States, is not uniform. In this country, two fundamentally diver
gent legal systems for allocating original ownership between
spouses co-exist. I refer, of course, to the profound difference be
tween the community-property and separate-property systems.
During an ongoing marriage, the basic principle in the sepa
rate-property states (also called common-law or title-based states)
is that marital status does not affect the ownership of property.
The regime is one of separate property. Each spouse owns all
that he or she earns. By contrast, in the community-property
states, each spouse acquires an ownership interest in half the
property the other earns during the marriage, regardless of how
the property is nominally titled. By granting each spouse upon
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acquisition an immediate half interest in the earnings of the other,
the community-property regimes directly recognize that spouses
are partners rather than sole proprietors.
A.

Historical Origins of Community and Separate
Property Systems

The divergence between separate and community marital prop
erty ideas dates to the thirteenth century. The separate-property
(title-based) system derives from English common law, while
community property developed in continental Europe and was
transplanted to the new world by French and Spanish settlers.
The reasons for the divergence between the systems in England
and the continental nations remain somewhat obscure. 1 One
plausible explanation is that, while England had all of the other
ingredients that led to community property in France, it lacked
any strong tradition of community within the family, at least one
that extended beyond the nuclear family. Professor Donahue has
argued: "Without any strong tradition of community, the English
lawyers could not group these same [French] elements together
and call it community. They lacked at an early stage the social
practice around which the legal concept could crystallize and at a
slightly later stage the legal concept around which the social
practice could crystallize. "2
There seems to be no doubt that the English system was male
dominated. Jeremy Bentham, the founder of Utilitarianism,
wrote that "the stronger [referring to males] have had all the pref
erences. Why? Because the stronger have made the laws."3 Un
til the latter part of the nineteenth century, the husband became
the owner of his wife's personalty upon marriage4 and had what
I. See Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present and
Future, !990 Wis. L. Rev. 807, 811-16.
2. Donahue, What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in
England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 86-87
(1979).
3. J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 177-78 (C.K. Ogden ed. 1931).
4. See T. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills 42 (2d ed. 1953).
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was called a "tenancy by the marital right" in his wife's land. 5
This gave the husband the right to the rents and profits from the
land his wife owned at the time of their marriage or acquired
during their marriage (until the birth of issue). Upon birth of
issue, the husband's tenancy turned into the estate in curtesy.
This system persisted in England and the United States until the
latter part of the nineteenth century. The estate was abolished by
legislation that came to be called the Married Women's Property
Acts. These acts actually differed in detail, but their basic effect
was to return the wife's property to her control, free from her
husband's claims or control. 6
B.

Community versus Separate Property in this Country

In this country, eight states originally adopted the community
property system and the other states and the District of Columbia
adopted the separate-property (common-law) system. What we
have, then, is communal ownership in nearly twenty percent of
the states, individual ownership in over eighty percent.
Reflect on how profoundly these systems differ. Community
property reinforces a married spouse's sense of participation in
the marriage and ownership of the marital estate. Separate prop
erty tends to place the nonpropertied spouse in a subordinate po
sition. How did this split on so fundamental a question come
about? It came about partly by historical accident. Community
property was mostly adopted in the territories first settled by
Spanish settlers. It "continues today chiefly in the states carved
out of the former Spanish possessions."7 This explains why the
eight original community-property states are located in the west
and south west. 8 The separate-property system, on the other
5. Haskins, Estates A rising from the Marriage Relationship and Their Char
acteristics, in I American Law of Property §§ 5 . 50-.55 (A. Casner ed. 1 952).
6. Jd. at § 5.56.
7. Moynihan, Community Property, in 2 American Law of Property § 7.2
(A. Casner ed. 1952).
8. The original community-property states were Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. This is not to say that

7
hand, was adopted in the territories first settled by English set
tlers, the eastern states, and it spread westward from there.
Historical accident may also explain why the original commu
nity-property states adopted the community of acquests concept
of the Spanish legal system. Under that concept, each spouse
owns a half interest in the earnings of the other acquired during
the marriage, in effect as a tenant in common; property acquired
prior to the marriage and property acquired during the marriage
by gift, bequest, or inheritance are not counted in the community,
and so remain separate property. The other community-property
model, called universal community, has not appeared in this
country. In universal-community systems, each spouse owns a
half interest in all the property of the other, regardless of the
property's source or time of acquisition. 9
Interest in the community-of-acquests system over the years
has not been limited to the original states, however. During the
1930s and 40s, before Congress allowed the joint income-tax re
turn for married persons, several separate-property states con
verted to community property in order to grant their residents
the tax benefits of community property's income-splitting effect.
When the income-splitting joint return was adopted in 1948,
these states converted back to the separate-property regime,
all these states adopted community law without debate, nor that all were once
Spanish possessions. Six of the original states adopted the English common law,
but at the same time or after several years, replaced the English system of dower
and curtesy with community property. See W. McClanahan, Community Prop
erty Law in the United States ch. 3 ( 1 982); Wenig, supra note 1 , at 8 1 8-2 1 .
9 . Because both spouses own community property, problems arise concern
ing management of community assets. Community-property states have statutes
prescribing who has power to manage and deal with the assets. These statutes
vary considerably in their details, but some generalizations are possible. In
Texas, the wife has sole management power over her earnings that are kept sepa
rate, and the husband has sole management power over his. In California and
several other community-property states, either spouse has power, acting alone,
to manage community assets. Both spouses, however, ordinarily are required to
join in transfers or mortgages of community real property. If one spouse makes a
gift of community property to a third party, the non-donor spouse may set it
aside entirely or in excess of a stated amount.
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which had the effect of conserving traditional gender roles and
power relationships within the marriage. 10
C.

The Uniform Marital Property Act

More recently, interest in community property has been rekin
dled by a growing conviction in favor economic equalization be
tween husbands and wives. The idea that each marital partner
should share equally acquests from the economic activity of the
other led to the promulgation in 1983 of the Uniform Marital
Property Act (UMPA). UMPA, drafted by our former president,
Bill Cantwell, adopts a version of the community of acquests,
although the terminology used in UMPA is different - commu
nity property is called "marital property," separate property is
called "individual property."1 1 Under UMPA, as under commu
nity property, each spouse acquires a present, vested ownership
right in all the assets acquired by the economic activities of either
during the marriage; the right does not depend on survival of the
other spouse. Wisconsin adopted UMPA in 1986, 1 2 and is now
properly counted as the ninth community-property state. 1 3
D.

Allocation Rules are Default Rules

Even these rules of original ownership are default rules. They
yield to a contrary intention. But the two systems are far from
parallel in how a contrary intention must be formed. For spouses
in community-property states to decide to operate as sole proprie10. See Jones, Split-In come and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender
Roles in the 1940s, 6 Law & Hist. Rev. 259 ( 1988); Wenig, supra note 1, at 82 1 24.
1 1 . With respect to income earned on individual property, UMPA follows
the minority view and provides in § 4(d) that "income earned or accrued by a
spouse or attributable to property of a spouse during marriage . . . is marital
property."
1 2. Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 766.001 -766.979.
1 3. See Rev. Rul. 87- 1 3, 1987-1 C.B. 20. For tax purposes, the implication
of this ruling is that the basis in both halves of marital property is stepped up to
the value at the date of the decedent's death under IRC § 1014(b)(6). If marital
property had been treated for tax purposes as tenancy-in-common property, only
the decedent's half would have received a stepped-up basis.
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tors, not financial partners, there must be mutual consent, in a
premarital or postmarital agreement. For spouses in separate
property states to operate as partners, the propertied spouse must
decide to give ownership rights to the other spouse, by outright
gift, or by putting his or her earnings into joint checking or
money market accounts, joint tenancies or tenancies by the en
tirety (which to varying degrees create property rights in the non
contributing spouse).
These rules, then, serve to reinforce the profoundly different
symbolical and psychological feelings within the ongoing mar
riage. Spouses are partners by right in community-property
states. Spouses are partners, if at all, by the generosity or contin
ued commitment to the marriage of the propertied spouse in sepa
rate-property states.
I shall return to the partnership theory of marriage in Part III
of the lecture, when I focus on spousal rights upon dissolution of
a marriage by divorce or disinheritance at death. Before that,
however, I'd like to turn to a discussion of spousal rights in
intestacy.

II.

SPOUSAL RIGHTS IN
INTESTACY

Intestacy laws build upon the rules that allocate original own
ership. Intestacy laws govern the distribution of property that
the decedent "owns" at death. In the separate-property states,
that means the property titled in the decedent's name. In the
community-property states, that means the decedent's half of the
community property and the decedent's separate property. Like
the original-ownership rules, intestacy laws serve as default rules.
The state's intestacy pattern of distribution prevails unless the de
cedent has made a valid will.
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A.

The Shift from Mandatory Rules to Default Rules

Intestacy laws have not always served as default rules. To be
sure, the power to dispose of personal property by will was recog
nized early. The ecclesiastical courts asserted jurisdiction over
succession to personal property on death, and encouraged be
quests for religious and charitable purposes, as well as for the
decedent's family. During the Anglo-Saxon period, testamentary
disposition of land was possible, but recognition ceased within
about a century after the Norman Conquest. The devise of land
by will "stood condemned," Maitland wrote, "because it is a
death-bed gift, wrung from a man in his agony. In the interest of
honesty, in the interest of the law state, a boundary must be main
tained against ecclesiastical greed and the other-worldliness of
dying men."14 The church courts never gained jurisdiction over
succession to land and the Crown courts were not concerned with
seeing that a man atoned for his wrongs by devoting a portion of
his property to pious objects.
This all came to a head in the Sixteenth Century. By the Eng
lish Statute of Wills of 1540, 15 men (but not women) were
granted the power to dispose of their land by will, in effect trans
forming intestacy from rules of mandatory law into default rules.
It was not until the Nineteenth Century that power of testation
was granted to women by the Married Women's Property Acts. 16
B.

Formulating Modern Intestacy Rules

How are or should modern intestacy rules be formulated, espe
cially regarding the intestate share of the surviving spouse? In
14. 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English Law 328 (2d ed. 1 9 1 1 ).
1 5. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 5, § 14.
1 6. For further discussion of the development of women's property rights in
the United States, seeN. Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and
Property in Nineteenth-Century New York ( 1 982); M. Salmon, Women and the
Law of Property in Early America ( 1 986); E. Warbase, The Changing Legal
Rights of Married Women 1 800- 1 86 1 (1 987); Chused, Married Women's Prop
erty Law, 1 800- 1 850 ( 1 983). See also S. Staves, Married Women's Separate
Property in England, 1 660- 1 833 ( 1990).

II

the last several years, the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform
Probate Code has had occasion to consider and debate that ques
tion. The result of that deliberation, in which representatives of
the College played a significant role, appears in the revisions of
the Uniform Probate Code, promulgated by the Uniform Law
Commissioners in 1990.
That or any other consideration of spousal rights in intestacy
must begin with the assumption that intestacy laws should reflect
"common" intention. This is another way of underscoring the
point that intestacy serves in default. No intestacy regime can
hope to be "suitable" for every person who dies intestate. People
whose individuated intention differs from common intention must
assume the responsibility of making a will; otherwise, their prop
erty will be distributed, by default, according to common inten
tion or, more accurately, according to intention as attributed to
them by the state legislature.
C.

Common Demographic Characteristics of Intestates
and their Surviving Spouses

In considering what intention legislatures should attribute to
decedents regarding their surviving spouses, we should first know
something about the demographics of those who predominantly
die intestate. As one might expect, decedents dying intestate tend
to be older and their estates tend to be rather modest. Although
younger people overwhelmingly do not have wills, 17 and so the
great majority of those dying young die intestate, they die in even
lower numbers than you might guess. Only about 0.5% of the
population (married and unmarried) die between ages 20 and 25,
another 0.6% die between ages 25 and 30, and another 0.5% die
between ages 30 and 35. That adds up to 1.6% dying between 20
1 7. In telephone surveys conducted in five states in 1 977, the following per
centages of persons in each age category said they did not have a will: 87.7% age
1 7 to 30, 65.4% age 3 1 to 45, 39.3% age 46-54, 36.6% age 55 to 64, and 1 5.4%
age 65 and over. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes About Property
Distribution at Death and Intestate succession Laws in the United States, 1 978
Am. B. Found. Res. J. 3 19, 336-39.
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and 35. Indeed, only another 0. 7% die between ages 35 and 40, 18
so that only 3.3% die in the two decades between ages 20 and 40.
It is between ages 60 and 90 that we get serious about dying, for
that is the period in which nearly three-fourths of the population
die.19 Although most people age 65 and older have wills, the mi
nority who die without wills make up a much larger number of
people than the cohort of young people who die prematurely.
In terms of wealth, 72.3% of persons with estates valued be
tween $0 and $99,999 do not have wills, 49.8% with estates be
tween $100,000 and $199,999 do not have wills, but only 15.4%
with estates between $200,000 and $1 million do not have wills. 20
We can expect, therefore, that decedents dying intestate will
typically be older than 60 and have an estate valued below
$200,000. What about the demographic characteristics of their
surviving spouses? We know that they will likely be wives, not
husbands, for wives tend to outlive their husbands. This is not
only because women live longer than men,21 but also because
wives tend to be, on average, nearly three years younger than
their husbands. 22 It should not be surprising, therefore, that mar
ried women of middle age, on average, will become widowed
before turning 70 and will live fifteen more years. 23
What are the needs of these surviving spouses? They are, by
and large, beyond working years. This forces them to rely to a
great extent on capital-generated income and makes them vulner1 8 . See Table 80CNSMT, in Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (CCH) � 64 1 5.301
(1 989).
19. See id.
20. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 17. The estate figures have been
adjusted for inflation. Between 1 977, when the surveys were conducted, and
1992, when this lecture was prepared, the consumer price index has about
doubled. To reflect this increase in inflation, I have doubled the figures reported
in the original article.
2 1 . Average life expectancy is projected to be 78 years for women, 72 years
for men. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1991, tbl. 105, at 73 ( l l l th ed. 1991).
22. See id. tbl. 1 32, at 88.
23. Nordheimer, A New Abuse of Elderly: Theft by Kin and Friends, New
York Times, Dec. 16, 199 1 , p. A I at p. A 1 2 col. 3.
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able to the ebbs and flows of interest rates. 24 Apart from their
social security payments and perhaps a small pension, the princi
pal source of income for nonworking surviving spouses is the in
come they earn on their investments. 25 For elderly surviving
spouses of less wealthy decedents, those who are most likely to
die intestate, that means the interest they earn on their certificates
of deposit. 26 As of 1991, average social security payments barely
exceeded the poverty level. The excess was only $34 a month for
nondisabled widows and widowers and only $76 a month for re
tired workers. 27 Contrary to the image of the elderly as "fat cats
24. See Barringer, As Interest Rates A re Cut, Retirees A re Stung, N.Y. Times
at 9 (July 5, 1992) (Retirees "see themselves as the economy's other losers . . . .
They invested in savings accounts and certificates of deposits, only to watch their
income be drastically reduced as the Federal Reserve sliced its discount rate from
6.5 percent in January of 1 99 1 to 3 percent last week."); Lewis, More Folks Feel
Pinch, 33 American Association of Retired Persons Bulletin 1 , 1 2 (March 1992)
("[R)esearchers at Economic Analysis Associates in Stowe, Vt., estimate that for
every percentage point drop in interest rates, investors 65 years and older lose
$ 1 5 billion of income. The loss for persons between 55 and 64 is calculated at $4
billion."); Liscio, Exploding Some Popular Myths, U.S. News & World Report 60
(March 16, 1 992) ("Economist Susan Stearne calculates that each I percentage
point drop in [short-term interest] rates costs the over-5 5 set about $ 1 9 billion in
interest income . . . . ").
25. As of 1990, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, the principal sources of
income for persons over 65 were social security (37.8%), earnings ( 1 5.5%), pen
sions ( 1 6.9%), and investments (24.7%). See Lewis, Ups and Downs of the
1980's: New Income Data Refutes [sic] "Fat Cat" A ge Stereotype, American Asso
ciation of Retired Persons Bulletin I, 1 5 (Feb. 1 992). Another study, conducted
in Florida, found that, in 1990, social security was the main source of income for
44% of those 60 and over. See Wilson, Interest-Rate Plunge Chills Savers, Ann
Arbor News, Feb. 9, 1 992, at C5, col. I (Associated Press).
26. The Public Policy Institute of the American Association of Retired Per
sons reports that people 65 and over derive 1 7.5% of their income from interest
bearing accounts, compared to just 5.5% for those 45 through 64 and 3% for
those under 45. See Lewis, supra note 24.
27. Average social security payments were $6,672 per year or $556 per
month for nondisabled widows and widowers and $7,236 per year or $603 per
month ($679/month for men, $5 1 8/month for women) for retired workers. See
U.S.Dep't of Health & Human Services, Social Security Administration, Social
Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement at 2, 1 78, 196 ( 1 99 1 ).
As of 1 990, the poverty level for single persons age 65 and over was $6,268 per
year or $522 per month. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Poverty in the United
States: 1990 at 195 ( 1 99 1). The government's "poverty index" is a very crude
measure, however. It is based largely on outdated assumptions concerning con
sumption behavior. By one study, "if the consumption standards used to calcu-
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living the good life at the expense of everybody else,"28 govern
ment reports indicate that "twenty percent of all elderly widows
were poor."29 About 40% of the elderly, in fact, are either poor
or near-poor, "near-poor" being defined as having an income no
more than two times the poverty level. 30 A Florida study re
cently found that 31% of those 60 and over reported incomes of
less than $10,000 annually. 31
Given these demographic characteristics of intestates and their
surviving spouses, I think we must next make certain basic as
sumptions about the marriage itself and the decedent's motives.
Sound public policy, I believe, requires that we assume that the
marriage is solid (that the partners remain committed to one an
other) and that the decedent has what may be described as "just"
motives. After all, the marriages we are talking about have ended
in death, not divorce, and there has been no effort by the decedent
to disinherit his or her surviving spouse. To assume that those
marriages are other than solid would be to make a distinctly un
fortunate cultural statement about the institution of marriage in
American society. Included within the assumption that dece
dents have "just" motives are that decedents mean to be generous
to their surviving spouses, mean to strike a fair balance between
their surviving spouses and children (that is, to be fair to all), but,
above all, in striking that fair balance, mean at the very least to
provide economic security for their surviving spouses. 32 The link,
of course, between need and intention is that need shapes intenlate the index were updated, it would raise aged poverty by at least 50 percent."
Schulz, "Poverty Level" - Worn-Out Words to Hide the Truth, 33 American
Association of Retired Persons Bulletin 18 (March 1992).
28. Lewis, supra note 25.
29. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Population Profile of the United States,
1 989, at 41 ( 1 989).
30. Lewis, supra note 25.
31. See Wilson, supra note 25.
32. Obviously, not all marriages are ideal and not all decedents have "just"
motives. But these assumptions are not unfair to people whose marriages or mo
tives fall outside the mold. Decedents whose marriages are less than ideal must
be expected to understand that their situation calls for individuated action. They
must make their own wills (or get divorced).
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tion - surviving spouses's need for economic security shapes de
cedents's intentions or, more accurately, shapes the intentions
that the state should properly attribute to decedents.
D.

Current Non-UPC Intestacy Laws are Typically
Based on the English Approach of Granting a
Fractional Share

How responsive are our current intestacy laws to these
demographics and assumptions? They do not respond well in
those states that still retain the pattern of intestacy transplanted
from England. This is because the English antecedent deter
mined the surviving spouse's share by fraction. Only in the larger
intestate estates can a fractional share provide the surviving
spouse with enough capital to generate an adequate stream of in
come. In the smaller intestate estates, such as in a $30,000 intes
tate estate, a fractional share of one-half gives the surviving
spouse only $15,000. The full $30,000 would be insufficient, but
the intestacy laws cannot manufacture larger estates for people.
The most they can do is give the full $30,000 to the surviving
spouse.
The English Statute of Distribution of 1670, which governed
the intestate distribution of personal property, did not even give a
one-half share. The share provided the decedent's widow in that
statute was one-third; the remaining two-thirds was divided
among the decedent's children or their issue by representation.
Only if there were no children or issue was the widow's share
increased to one-half; the other half went to the decedent's ances
tors and collateral relatives. Under no circumstances did the
widow have a right to her husband's entire estate. The statute did
not bother to provide for a surviving husband's share because, as
noted earlier, the wife's personalty became her husband's upon
marriage.
The descent of land followed a similar pattern of fractional
shares for widows. Although surviving spouses received no share
at all under the canons of descent, they were provided for by the
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estates of dower and curtesy. Dower gave each widow a life es
tate in one-third of her deceased husband's land. Curtesy gave
each widower a life estate in all of his deceased wife's land.
For the most part, the non-UPC intestacy laws of this country
follow a similar pattern. If the decedent is survived by children
(or descendants of deceased children), the spouse's share will
likely be one-third, with the remaining two-thirds going to the
decedent's descendants. 33 This is so even when some or all of
them are minors, in which case any portion the minors inherit
must be placed in a normally cumbersome and expensive guardi
anship form of ownership. More importantly, it is also so even
when some or all of them are able-bodied adults with adequate
means of support, in which case the surviving spouse is the more
typical surviving spouse who is elderly and dependent on capital
for income. If the decedent is not survived by children (or de
scendants of deceased children), but is survived by one or both
parents, the spouse's share will likely be one-half, with the other
half going to the decedent's parent or parents, even though the
parents may be financially self-sufficient ("WOOPS," in new
speak, standing for well-off older people).34 Only if the decedent
leaves no surviving descendants or parents does the surviving
spouse commonly inherit the entire intestate estate.
33. Other variations exist. Some non-UPC statutes provide for a 50/50 split
between the surviving spouse and the descendants. Others provide the spouse a
one-half share if there is one descendant but a one-third share if there is more
than one descendant, the remaining half or two-thirds going to the descendants.
Still others provide a variety of unique patterns of division between the spouse
and descendants. Normally, no distinction is drawn between decedent's descend
ants who are also descendants of the spouse and those descendants who are not
also the spouse's descendants. For a compilation of the various statutory pat
terns as of 1 978, see Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1 7, at 357 n. l 28.
34. Other variations exist. In a few states, the spouse must share the estate
with the decedent's siblings if both parents have predeceased. Others have unique
systems for allocating the estate between the spouse and parents. Some non-UPC
law gives the entire estate to the surviving spouse and nothing to the decedent's
parents. See id. at 348-50.

17
E.

The Uniform Probate Code

As originally promulgated in 1969, the Uniform Probate Code
(pre-1990 UPC) continued the common practice of granting the
decedent's surviving spouse the entire intestate estate when the
decedent left neither surviving issue nor surviving parents. But
the pre-1990 UPC made a significant and ingenious departure
from the factional-share approach commonly applied to cases in
which there were surviving issue or a surviving parent. Here, the
pre-1990 UPC used a lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach.35 The
genius of the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach is that it gives
the surviving spouse first claim to a certain amount of capital. If
the lump sum specified is adequate and if the estate is large
enough to discharge that responsibility and have assets to spare,
then dividing the remaining part of the estate between the spouse
and the issue or parents does not jeopardize the spouse's eco
nomic security. In the pre-1990 Code, when the cost of living
was less than a third of what it is today, the lump sum granted off
the top was $50,000.36 Only to the extent the estate exceeded that
minimum figure of $50,000 (over $150,000 in today's dollars)
would the balance be split between the spouse and children or
parents. In a $100,000 estate, for example, the spouse's share was
$75,000, with $25,000 going to the decedent's descendants or par
ents. In a $150,000 estate, the spouse took $100,000, with
$50,000 going to the descendants or parents.
Studies before and after 1969 suggest that the pre-1990 Code
may not have gone far enough. These empirical studies have
identified a strong social preference to give the entire estate to the
surviving spouse, even when the decedent has surviving children
or parents. Some of these studies were based on an examination
of the probated wills of similarly situated decedents who died
35. The lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach was derived from § 22 of the
Model Probate Code.
36. Some states adopting a lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach have used a
different figure, ranging from a low of $20,000 in Florida and Missouri to a high
of $ 100,000 in Alabama.
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during a particular time frame in a particular localityY Other
studies were based on interviews with living persons. 3 8
The message of these studies seems clear: The typical decedent
with children sees the surviving spouse in a dual role - first and
foremost as the decedent's primary beneficiary, but also as a con
duit through which to benefit their children. If the decedent dies
prematurely, at a time when the couple's children are still minors,
the surviving spouse is seen as occupying a better position to use
the decedent's property for the benefit of their children, as well as
for himself or herself. For a decedent who lives well beyond the
minority of their children, as most do, the surviving spouse will
likely be older and have greater economic needs than their chil
dren. By then the children are probably middle-aged, working
adults whose support comes from labor-generated income, as op
posed to the surviving spouse, who is likely to be dependent on
37. See. e. g. , M. Sussman, J. Cates & D. Smith, The Family and Inheritance
86-87, 89-90, 143- 45 ( 1970) (for those testators survived by spouse and lineal kin,
85.8 percent of the decedent testators (N 226) and 85.3 percent of the testators
(N 367) in the survivor population provided that the spouse receive the entire
estate; in 33 of 37 cases where the testator was not survived by lineal descendants
or ascendants but was survived by a spouse, the spouse received the entire estate);
Browder, Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England,
67 Mich. L. Rev. 1 303, 1307-09 ( 1 969) (26 of the 54 testators left their entire
estates to their spouse and not to their issue; of those 1 8 testators who distributed
the estate to both spouse and issue, six designed their wills to give the spouse only
that amount equal to the maximum marital deduction available for federal estate
tax purposes at that time; in 9 of the 13 instances in which the testator was
survived by a spouse and no children, the testator gave the spouse the entire
estate); Dunham, The Method. Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmissions at
Death, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 24 1 , 252-53 ( 1 963) (in the 22 testate estates where the
deceased was survived by spouse and children, 100 percent left all of the property
to the spouse; in all but one of the six cases in which the testator was survived by
a spouse but no children, the testator gave the spouse all of the property).
38. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1 7, at 3 5 1 -54, 358-64, 366-68
(found the majority favored granting entire estate to the spouse regardless of the
level of wealth involved); Contemporary Studies Project, A Comparison of
Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and [Pre- 1990]
Uniform Probate Codes, 63 Iowa L. Rev. 104 1 , 1089 ( 1978) (found the percent
age who favored granting the entire estate to the spouse decreased as the level of
wealth increased); U.K. Law Comm'n, Report on Family Law: Distribution on
Intestacy, 1989, No. 1 87, app. C, at 36-37, 40- 45 (well over 70% of the respon
dents favored the spouse receiving the entire estate regardless of whether the
decedent was also survived by minor children, adult children, or siblings).
=

=
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capital-generated income to lift him or her above the poverty
level. That does not mean, however, that the conduit theory does
not operate for adult children. The adult children stand to inherit
any unconsumed portion of the decedent's property at the surviv
ing spouse's death.
These studies, along with other evidence, 39 led the Joint Edito
rial Board to make substantial changes in the spouse's share in
the 1990 Code. The 1990 Code continues the pattern of giving
the surviving spouse the entire estate when the decedent is not
survived by descendants or parents. It goes further, however, and
provides that the surviving spouse also receives the entire estate
when the decedent is survived by descendants, as long as those
descendants are also the descendants of the surviving spouse and
the surviving spouse has no descendants who are not the
decedent's.
Marriages with step-children - sometimes called "blended
families" - are another matter. With divorce and remarriage a
common circumstance in society today, many married couples
will end up having children by prior marriages on one or both
sides.40 By introducing divided loyalties, the existence of step
children weakens the conduit theory. A statute that gives the en
tire estate to the surviving spouse of a decedent who leaves chil39. The move to have the spouse inherit the entire estate is aligned with
trends in intestacy laws throughout the U.S. and Europe. A recent report of the
U.K. Law Commission recommended granting the surviving spouse the entire
intestate estate in all circumstances. See U.K. Law Comm'n, supra note 38, at 812. In her recent book, Mary Ann Glendon has identified this trend, which she
calls the "shrinking circle of heirs" phenomenon. See M. Glendon, The Trans
formation of Family Law 238 (1989). By this she means that, over time,
throughout the U.S. and Europe, "the position of the surviving spouse has stead
ily improved everywhere at the expense of the decedent's blood relatives." /d.
She goes on to point out that this trend "strikingly illustrate[s] the movement of
modem marriage into the foreground of family relationships." /d. at 239. It
recognizes "the gradual attenuation of legal bonds among family members
outside the conjugal unit of husband, wife, and children," and "[t]he tendency to
view a marriage that lasts until death as a union of the economic interests of the
spouses . . . . " /d. at 238, 240.
40. "One out of every three Americans is now a stepparent, a stepchild, a
stepsibling, or some other member of a stepfamily." Larson, Understanding
Stepfamilies, Am. Demographics, July 1 992, at 36.
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dren by a prior marriage puts those children at the risk of
permanent "loss" of inheritance. Similarly, a statute that gives
the entire estate to the surviving spouse who has children by a
prior marriage puts the decedent's children at risk of partial loss
of inheritance.41 Thus, the dilemma in the stepparent situations
becomes one of striking a reasonable balance between the needs of
the surviving spouse and the inheritance expectations of the dece
dent's children.
The pre-1990 Code sought to address the question of step-rela
tionships. Under the pre-1990 Code, the surviving spouse of a
decedent who had children by a prior marriage did not receive a
lump-sum-plus-a-fraction. The pre-1990 Code reverted to the
straight fractional-share approach in that situation. The pre-1990
Code provided for a 50/50 split of the decedent's property be
tween the decedent's spouse and descendants. The problem with
this approach is that it sacrifices the surviving spouse's economic
security in the smaller to modest estates in order to preserve in
heritance expectations of adult children who, unlike the surviving
spouse, are in the labor market and not forced to rely for subsis
tence on capital-generated income. Remember also that the fact
that the decedent has children by a prior marriage does not neces
sarily mean that the decedent did not have any joint children with
the second and surviving spouse. Nor does it necessarily mean
that the decedent's second marriage was a short-term, late-in-life
marriage.42 The decedent's second marriage could, in fact, be his
or her main marriage in life.
4 1 . The possibility that the same moral conflict will arise after the decedent's
death, should the surviving spouse remarry and have children by his or her new
spouse, exists but must be disregarded. As currently constituted, intestacy law
requires the decision as to how much to award the surviving spouse to be made
on the basis of the facts existing at the decedent's death.
42. Even if it was, the decedent's surviving spouse may deserve this amount
as rough compensation for having taken care of the decedent in his or her dying
years. For every person receiving long-term care in a nursing home, another 2
people living in the community have long-term care needs. Seventy to 80% of
these people are cared for by their families at home. See Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Ass'n, Lon g-Term Care 2, I I ( 1 992).
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The 1990 revtswns address the step-children dilemma differ
ently. The 1990 revisions invoke the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction
device for these situations also. The intent is to grant a share that
is commensurate with the size of the estate and the circumstances
of the family make-up. In the typical intestate estate of small to
modest size, this approach would give the surviving spouse the
entire estate.43 In allocating scarce resources such as these,
granting economic security to the surviving spouse appears more
important than playing to the inheritance expectations of the de
cedent's adult children.
In the larger intestate estates, the UPC approach is predicated
on the notion that the decedent would feel that some provision
for his or her children would not deprive the surviving spouse of
economic security.44 For larger estates, the lump-sum-plus-a
fraction device assures that the decedent's children receive an
inheritance.
The 1990 Code draws a distinction between cases in which only
the surviving spouse has children by a prior marriage and cases in
which the decedent has children by a prior marriage. In the for43. A factor that makes this even more likely is that, under the UPC scheme,
the intestate share is in addition to the probate exemptions and allowances,
which run mostly in favor of the surviving spouse. Specifically, § 2- 402 gives the
surviving spouse a homestead allowance of $ 1 5,000 ; § 2- 403 gives the surviving
spouse an exempt property allowance up to $ 1 0,000 in household furniture,
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects (non-liquid assets and
therefore not available to generate income); and §§ 2- 404 and -405 authorize the
personal representative to determine a family allowance up to $ 1 ,500/month for
one year ($ 1 8,000 ) without court authority. The family allowance does not nec
essarily go exclusively to the surviving spouse, however. If the decedent left mi
nor or dependent children who are not living with the surviving spouse, the
allowance may go partly to or for the benefit of those children and partly to the
surviving spouse. If the decedent left children by a prior marriage who are
adults, and if the surviving spouse has ample resources (including life-insurance
proceeds etc. from the decedent by way of will substitute), the personal represent
ative can take those resources into account and determine a family allowance of a
lesser amount and if the personal representative does not determine a lesser
amount, the children can challenge the personal representative's decision.
44. Economic security for the surviving spouse would be further safeguarded
in estates in which the decedent created will substitutes providing for the spouse,
such as joint tenancies, joint checking, savings, or money-market accounts, life
insurance contracts, and pension plan arrangements.
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mer case, the surviving spouse is granted the first $150,000 plus
50% of any remaining balance. In the latter case, the surviving
spouse is granted the first $100,000 plus 50% of any remaining
balance.
Lest granting the surviving spouse a minimum claim on the
first $100,000 appears over-generous, and hence unfair to the de
cedent's children by the prior marriage, consider that at today's
"CD" interest rates of around 4%,45 $100,000 generates only
$333 a month ($4,000 a year) in income. With average social se
curity payments added in, the surviving spouse's income only
rises to $889 a month ($10,668 a year), which is a mere $367 a
month ($4400 a year) above the poverty level. This still puts the
surviving spouse into the category of the near-poor (defined as
persons with incomes less than twice the poverty level). Even if
short-term interest rates return to the 8% level of a year and a
half ago, the income yield rises only $333 a month ($4,000 a
year). A surviving spouse who only has social security and
$100,000 in assets will still be in jeopardy of outliving those as
sets, especially if he or she lives into deep old age, as so many now
do. To the extent that the interest plus social security prove in
sufficient, capital will need to be drawn down, perhaps to the
point of exhaustion or near exhaustion, or standard of living will
need to be further lowered.46 With high real estate taxes and high
costs of prescription drugs and other medical procedures not cov
ered by Medicare, not to mention nursing home expenses should
that become necessary,47 the cost of living for the elderly often
rises faster than the general inflation rate.
45. Current interest rates on 6-month CD's average 3.68%; on ! -year CD's,
4.03%; and on 21/2-year CD's, 4.9 1 %. See N.Y. Times, July 5, 1 992, § 3, at 1 6.
46. We are currently experiencing a general inflation rate of about 3 . 1 %. See
N.Y. Times, July 15, 1992, C l at C 1 3. If $ 100,000 is invested in "CDs" yielding
4% interest, and if $10,000 is withdrawn each year (adjusted upward for a 3%
inflation rate), $ 100,000 will only last 10 years. Reducing annual withdrawals to,
say, $7,000 extends the period to 1 5 years. See tables published in J. Quinn,
Making the Most of Your Money 893-94 ( 1 991).
47. Two out of 5 people over 65 will spend some time in a nursing home
during their lifetimes. Nearly 75% of all nursing home residents are women.
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These computations assume that the surviving spouse receives
as much as $100,000 in cash that can be invested in "CDs." In
fact, some of the decedent's estate will probably be distributed in
kind, that is, in the form of specific assets that are illiquid, thus
decreasing the income-generating potential of the spouse's share.
Of course, some surviving spouses need not depend on a share
of the decedent's intestate estate for economic security. Some al
ready have independent means or will benefit from will substi
tutes such as life insurance, pension death benefits or annuities,
joint tenancies, or joint banking or money market accounts. Be
cause intestacy laws, by tradition, are kept simple, however, they
do not reduce the spouse's share by the amount of the spouse's
assets. Unless this constraint on the intestacy laws is to be bro
ken, it necessitates designing those laws on the assumption that
the surviving spouse does not have independent means and will
not benefit appreciably from will substitutes. This approach is
the only way to guarantee all surviving spouses a minimum de
gree of economic security. It does require, not unfairly, it seems
to me, the decedent whose spouse has economic security to make
a will in favor of his or her children by the prior marriage, if that
is what the decedent thinks is appropriate.
Costs range from $20,000 to $80,000 per year; 36% of these costs are currently
borne by Medicaid. See Teachers Insurance and Annuity Ass'n, Long-Term
Care 2, 1 1 ( 1 992). Note that the more the intestacy laws reduce the surviving
spouse's share in order to favor adult children by a prior marriage, the more
likely it becomes that state funds will have to be expended under Medicaid for
nursing home care of the surviving spouse. This point alone should make state
legislators more sympathetic to the UPC's l ump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach
than to the inheritance expectations of the decedent's adult children by a prior
marriage.

24

III.

SPOUSAL RIGHTS UPON

DIVORCE AND AGAINST
DISINHERITANCE
Suppose the decedent does make a will that gives little or noth
ing to the surviving spouse. In the United States,48 the dece
dent's spouse is the only relative who is protected against
intentional disinheritance.49 Like the question of allocation of
original ownership, disinheritance of a surviving spouse brings
into question the fundamental nature of the economic rights of
each spouse in a marital relationship, of how the institution of
marriage is viewed in society. As noted earlier, the contemporary
view of marriage is that it is a partnership, and that the financial
component of marriage is that it is an economic partnership. 50
48. In contrast, in the western European nations, a decedent cannot totally
disinherit his or her children and sometimes cannot totally disinherit other blood
relatives. In England and the principal commonwealth jurisdictions (the A ustra
lian states, most of the Canadian provinces, and New Zealand), the statutory
scheme known as Testator's Family Maintenance (TFM) is in place, by which
the chancery judge is empowered to revise the dispositive provisions of a testa
tor's will (including intestate shares, in an intestate estate) for the benefit of the
decedent's relatives and other dependents.
49. The decedent's children and possibly more remote descendants are
granted protection only against unintentional disinheritance.
50. One of the earliest American expressions of the partnership theory of
marriage appears in the 1 963 Report of the Committee on Civil and Political
Rights to the President's Commission on the Status of Women. As quoted in the
Prefatory Note to the Uniform Marital Property Act, the Report states:
Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes a different but equally
important contribution. This fact has become increasingly recognized in the
realities of American family living. While the laws of other countries have
reflected this trend, family laws in the United States have lagged behind.
The strength of the attribution to marriage of an economic partnership is evi
denced by the recent New Jersey case of Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872 (N.J. 1 990).
In that case, a husband, after having left his wife of seventeen years, died during
the pendency of a divorce proceeding initiated by the wife. The husband's will
devised his entire estate to his children by a former marriage. The court held that
the husband's death terminated the divorce proceeding under which the wife
would have been entitled to a share determined under New Jersey's equitable
distribution statute. The wife also had no recourse under New Jersey's elective
share statute because that statute withheld an elective share from a surviving
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A.

The Partnership Theory of Marriage5 1

The partnership theory of marriage, sometimes called the mari
tal-sharing theory, is variously stated and supported. Sometimes
it is portrayed "as an expression of the presumed intent of hus
bands and wives to pool their fortunes on an equal basis, share
and share alike."52 Under this approach, the economic rights of
each spouse are seen as deriving from an unspoken or imputed
spouse if the decedent and spouse were not living together at the time of the
decedent's death. Despite the wife's inability to recover under either the divorce
or elective-share statute, the court held:
We conclude . . . that the principle that animates both (the equitable
distribution and elective-share] statutes is that a spouse may acquire an in
terest in marital property by virtue of the mutuality of efforts during mar
riage that contribute to the creation, acquisition, and preservation of such
property. This principle, primarily equitable in nature, is derived from no
tions of fairness, common decency, and good faith. Further, we are con
vinced that these laws do not reflect a legislative intent to extinguish the
property entitlement of a spouse who finds himself or herself beyond the
reach of either statute because the marriage has realistically but not legally
ended at the time of the other's death.
In the exercise of their common-law jurisdiction, courts should seek to
effectuate sound public policy and mold the law to embody the societal val
ues that are exemplified by such public policy . . . .
The constructive trust, we believe, is an appropriate equitable remedy in
this type of case . . . [that] should be invoked and imposed on the marital
property under the control of the executor of [the husband's] estate . . . to
avoid the unjust enrichment that would occur if the marital property devolv
ing to [the husband's] estate included the share beneficially belonging to [the
wife].
In a footnote, the court noted that efforts were currently pending in the New
Jersey legislature to correct the problem of a surviving spouse who falls outside
the protection of both statutes.
5 1 . In the late Eighteenth Century, Jeremy Bentham sought, unsuccessfully,
to reform the English common-law system by writing a model law of succession.
Some of his ideas seem to reflect a conception of marriage as a partnership. He
wrote:
Article I. No distinction between the sexes; what is said of one extends to
the other. The portion of the one shall be always equal to that of the other.
Reason.- Good of equality. . . .
Article II. After the husband's death, the widow shall retain half the
common property; unless some different arrangement was made by the
marriage contract.
J. Bentham, supra note 3, at 1 78-79 (Emphasis added).
52. M. Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 1 3 1 ( 1989).
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marital bargain under which the partners agree that each is to
enjoy a half interest in the economic production of the marriage,
that is, in the property nominally acquired by and titled in the
sole name of either partner during the marriage (other than in
property acquired by gift or inheritance). A decedent who disin
herits his or her surviving spouse is seen as having reneged on the
bargain. Sometimes the theory is visualized in restitutionary
terms, a return-of-contribution notion. Under this approach, the
law grants each spouse an entitlement to compensation for non
monetary contributions to the marital enterprise, as "a recogni
tion of the activity of one spouse in the home and to compensate
not only for this activity but for opportunities lost."53 Sometimes
the theory is stated in aspirational and behavior-shaping terms:
[T]he ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal partner
ships between spouses who share resources, responsibilities, and
risks . . . .
From a policy standpoint, this partnership framework is desira
ble both because it encourages cooperative commitments between
spouses and because it serves broader egalitarian and caretaking
objectives. In effect, sharing principles hold promise for bridging
traditional public/private divisions between family and market. A
partnership model can cushion the impact of persistent gender bi
ases in couples' private allocation of homemaking tasks and in the
public allocation of salaries and benefits. By sharing their total re
sources, families can spread the risks and benefits of sex-linked
roles, the remnants of a socioeconomic system that makes it difficult
for any one individual to accommodate a full work and family
life. . . .
Not only do partnership principles promote gender equality; they
also support caretaking commitments toward children and elderly
dependents. 54

Part I of this lecture was devoted to a description of the rules
that allocate original ownership in a marriage. The fundamental
divergence between the community-property and separate-prop53. !d.
54. Rhode & Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms, in
Divorce Reform at the Crossroads 1 9 1 , 1 98-99 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds.
1 990).

27
erty systems reveals that the community-property system imple
ments the partnership theory while the separate-property system
does not.
B.

Equitable Distribution Upon Divorce55

The community-property system directly treats a couple's en
terprise as collaborative, by granting each spouse a one-half inter
est in the earnings of the other immediately upon acquisition.
Today all or nearly all56 of the separate-property states also give
effect, or purport to give effect, to the partnership theory at disso
lution of a marriage upon divorce. 57 Under so-called equitable
distribution statutes, courts are given broad discretion "to assign
55. For a collection of excellent essays on divorce-reform laws, see Divorce
Reform at the Crossroads (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1 990).
56. In 1989, Professor Oldham reported that "Mississippi is the only state
that has not clearly accepted [the equitable-distribution] system. See Jones v.
Jones, 532 So.2d 574 (Miss. 1988)." Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Trans
mutation , 23 Fam. L.Q. 2 1 9, 2 1 9 n. 1 ( 1 989).
For a fascinating account of how this system swept the country, see Glendon,
Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, in The
Cambridge Lectures 245 (N. Eastham & B. Krivy eds. 198 1).
57. In Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974), a landmark case
interpreting New Jersey's equitable-distribution statute, the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated:
The statute we are considering authorizes the courts, upon divorce, to divide
marital assets equitably between the spouses. . . . [T]he enactment seeks to
right what many have felt to be a grave wrong. It gives recognition to the
essential supportive role played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that
as homemaker, wife and mother she should clearly be entitled to a share of
family assets accumulated during the marriage. Thus the division of prop
erty upon divorce is responsive to the concept that marriage is a shared
enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways it is akin to a partnership.
Only if it is clearly understood that far more than economic factors are in
volved, will the resulting distribution be equitable within the true intent and
meaning of the statute . . . . The widely pervasive effect this remedial legisla
tion will almost certainly have throughout our society betokens its great
significance.

Id. at 501-02. Although in this early equitable-distribution case, the court re
fused to establish a presumptive division of marital assets on a 50/50 basis, see id.
at 503 n.6, many courts today do indulge in such a presumption of equal division,
and many of the more recently enacted statutes explicitly do so also. See J. Greg
ory, The Law of Equitable Distribution � 8.03 ( 1 989).
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to either spouse property acquired during the marriage, irrespec
tive of title, taking into account the circumstances of the particu
lar case and recognizing the value of the contributions of a
nonworking spouse or homemaker to the acquisition of that prop
erty. Simply stated, the system of equitable distribution views
marriage as essentially a shared enterprise or joint undertaking in
the nature of a partnership to which both spouses contribute directly and indirectly, financially and nonfinancially - the fruits
of which are distributable at divorce. "58
The equitable-distribution scheme was first introduced by the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA). As originally
promulgated in 1970, the UMDA required that "marital" prop
erty be distinguished from "nonmarital," or "separate" property.
Only the former was subject to distribution at divorce. This dis
tinction, which was drawn from community-property law and
generally corresponds to community and separate property, cre
ated various characterization problems. For example, are in
creases in value of admittedly nonmarital property during
marriage marital or nonmarital? The statute's approach to char
acterization was similar to that in a community of acquests re
gime: a presumption that all assets acquired by either spouse
during marriage are marital. Several exceptions to this presump
tion existed: (1) assets that either spouse brought to the marriage,
including assets that could be traced back to such assets; (2) as
sets that either spouse acquired during marriage other than from
earnings; and (3) assets that both spouses agreed to exclude from
distribution upon dissolution of their marriage.
In response to characterization problems that the marital!
nonmarital assets dichotomy created, the UMDA was subse
quently amended to abolish that distinction. The UMDA now
describes the property subject to distribution as "property and
assets belonging to either [spouse] or both however and whenever
acquired. . "59 This provision creates what is called a "hotch.

.

58. J. Gregory, supra note 57, � 1 .03 at 1-6.
59. UMDA § 307.
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pot" property scheme. This change eliminates the characteriza
tion problem, but it makes the question how the property should
be distributed more difficult. 60
Among the states that have not adopted UMDA, there are
considerable differences in the statutes concerning what property
is subject to division.61 Once the court has determined what
property is divisible, however, it has power to order the title-hold
ing spouse to transfer all or a part of divisible assets to the other
spouse. The statutes differ regarding the criteria by which courts
are to make distributive decisions, but, in general, equitable distri
bution is characterized by a considerable degree of judicial discre
tion. This feature is an important difference between the
equitable-distribution and community-property regimes. Despite
this difference, however, equitable distribution approximates
community property at divorce by implementing the partnership
theory.62 The widespread adoption of equitable-distribution stat
utes is a source of pressure on separate-property states to imple
ment the partnership theory in the other circumstances in which
spousal property rights loom large - disinheritance at death.
C.

Protection Against Disinheritance

1.

CONVENTIONAL ELECTIVE-S HARE LAW

All but one of the separate-property states63 have decided that
disinheritance of the surviving spouse at death is one of the few
60. See Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 Fam. L.Q. 147,
1 5 1 -56, 1 59-6 1 ( 1989).
6 1 . The various schemes are canvassed, state-by-state, in J. Gregory, supra
note 56; J. Oldham, Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property ( 1989);
and L. Golden, Equitable Distribution of Property ( 1983).
62. See Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law
Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1 269 (198 1).
63. Georgia is the only separate-property state lacking an elective-share stat
ute. For a discussion of the reasons for Georgia's position, including its unusual
"year's support" practice, and an argument that elective-share statutes are gener
ally unnecessary, see Chaffin, A R eappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process:
The Survivin g Spouse, Year's Support and Intestate Succession, 10 Ga. L. Rev.
447 ( 1976). For an opposing view, see Note, Preventing Spousal Disinh eritance in
Georgia, 1 9 Ga. L. Rev. 427 ( 1 985).
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instances in which the decedent's testamentary freedom with re
spect to title-based ownership interests must be curtailed. 64 No
matter what the decedent's intent, the separate-property states
recognize that the surviving spouse has a claim to some portion of
the decedent's estate. These statutes, which in all but a few states
have replaced the common-law estates of dower and curtesy, 65
provide the spouse a so-called "forced" share. Because the forced
share is expressed as an option that the survivor can elect or let
lapse during the administration of the decedent's estate, and not
as a retitling of the decedent's property that automatically occurs
at death, the more descriptive term "elective" share is often used.
Elective-share law in the separate-property states has not
caught up to the partnership theory of marriage. Under typical
American elective-share law, including the elective share pro
vided by the pre-1990 UPC, a surviving spouse is granted a right
to claim a one-third share of the decedent's estate, not a right to
claim the one-half share of the couple's combined assets that the
partnership theory would imply.
To illustrate the discrepancy between the partnership theory
and conventional elective-share law, consider first a long-term
marriage, in which the couple's combined assets were accumu
lated mostly during the course of the marriage. The elective
share fraction of one-third of the decedent's estate plainly does
64. A unique feature of community-property regimes is that a decedent's sur
viving spouse is not seen as needing "protection" against disinheritance by means
of a so-called "elective" share in the estate of the deceased spouse. The survivor
already owns a half interest in the fruits of the marriage. No elective share is
provided with respect to the separate or individual property of the other spouse
because that property was not attributable to the fruits of the marriage. Contri
bution having been rewarded, the decedent can be allowed unfettered power of
disposition over his or her separate or individual property and over his or her
half of the community or marital property.
65. The Restatement of Property lists five jurisdictions as providing the sur
viving spouse a dower or dower-like interest in the decedent's real property Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Ohio, and West Virginia. See Re
statement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) § 34. 1 stat. note ( 1 992).
Dower, however, was abolished in West Virginia in 1992 incident to enactment
of the UPC's accrual-type elective share, as described infra text accompanying
notes 68-80.
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not implement a partnership principle. The actual result is gov
erned by which spouse happens to die first and by how the prop
erty accumulated during the marriage was nominally titled.
Consider Harry and Wilma. Assume that Harry and Wilma
were married in their twenties or early thirties. They never di
vorced, and Harry died somewhat prematurely at age, say, 62,
survived by Wilma. For whatever reason, Harry left a will en
tirely disinheriting Wilma. Throughout their long marriage, the
couple managed to accumulate assets worth $600,000, marking
them as a somewhat affluent but hardly wealthy couple.
Under conventional elective-share law, Wilma's ultimate enti
tlement is governed by the manner in which these $600,000 in
assets were nominally titled as between them. Wilma could end
up significantly better off or significantly less well off than a 50/50
principle would suggest. The reason is that under conventional
elective-share law, Wilma has a claim to one-third of Harry's
"estate."
In a marriage in which the marital assets were disproportion
ately titled in the decedent's name, as is typical in a traditional
support marriage in which the husband dies first, conventional
elective-share law often entitles the survivor to less than an equal
share. Thus, if Harry "owned" all $600,000 of the marital assets,
Wilma's claim against Harry's estate would only be for $200,000
- well below Wilma's $300,000 entitlement produced by the
partnership principle. If Harry "owned" $500,000 of the marital
assets, Wilma's claim would only be for $ 166,500 ( 113 of
$500,000), which when combined with Wilma's "own" $ 100,000
yields a less-than-equal share of $266,500 for Wilma - still below
the $300,000 figure produced by the partnership principle.
In a marriage in which the marital assets were more or less
equally titled, conventional elective-share law grants the survivor
a right to take a disproportionately large share. If Harry and
Wilma each owned $300,000, Wilma is still granted a claim for an
additional $ 100,000.
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Finally, in a marriage in which the marital assets were dispro
portionately titled in the survivor's name, conventional elective
share law entitles the survivor to compound the disproportion. If
only $200,000 were titled in Harry's name, Wilma would still
have a claim against Harry's estate for $66,667 (1!3 of $200,000),
even though Wilma was already overcompensated as measured
by the partnership theory.
I should now like to draw attention to a very different sort of
marriage - a short-term marriage, particularly the short-term
marriage later in life, in which each spouse typically comes into
the marriage with assets derived from a former marriage. In
these marriages, the one-third fraction of the decedent's estate far
exceeds a 50/50 division of assets acquired during the marriage.
To illustrate this sort of marriage, let us turn to the case of
Wilma and Sam. Suppose that a few years after Harry's death,
Wilma married Sam. Suppose that both Wilma and Sam were in
their mid-to-later sixties when they were married. Then suppose
that after a few years of marriage - five, let us say -, Wilma
died survived by Sam. Assume further that both Wilma and Sam
have adult children and a few grandchildren by their prior mar
riages, and that each would prefer to leave most or all of his or
her property to those children.
Assuming that Wilma and Sam entered their marriage equally
well off, each with $300,000 in assets, conventional elective-share
law, for reasons that are not immediately apparently, gives the
survivor, Sam, a right to shrink Wilma's estate (and hence the
share of Wilma's children by her prior marriage to Harry) by
$100,000 (reducing it to $200,000) while supplementing Sam's as
sets (which will likely go to Sam's children by his prior marriage)
by $100,000 (increasing their value to $400,000).
In this type of marriage, in other words, conventional elective
share law basically rewards the children of the remarried spouse
who manages to outlive the other, arranging for those children a
windfall share of one-third of the "loser's" estate. The "winning"
spouse - the one who chanced to survive - gains a windfall, for
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this "winner" is unlikely to have made a contribution, monetary
or otherwise, to the "loser's" wealth remotely worth one-third.
How prevalent are marriages like that between Wilma and Sam
- the remarriage later in life ending in the death of one of the
partners a few years later? Plainly, such marriages do not affect a
high proportion of the widowed and divorced population. Never
theless, government data suggest that the incidence of such mar
riages may not be insignificant. 66 Equally to the point, when such
marriages occur, conventional elective-share law renders results
that are dramatically inconsistent with the partnership theory of
marriage. That these results are seen as unjust by the children of
the decedent's former marriage is both unsurprising and well doc66. Government data reveal that, within the widowed and divorced popula
tion at large, not disaggregated by age, about 2 1 % of widowed men and about
8% of widowed women remarry; and about 83% of divorced men and 78% of
divorced women remarry. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Pub. No.
89- 1923, Remarriages and Subsequent Divorces - United States 1 2 ( 1989). The
average (mean) ages at the time of remarriage of widowed men and women have
steadily increased from 57.7 in 1970 to 60.2 in 1983 for men and from 50.3 in
1 970 to 52.6 in 1 983 for women. The average (mean) ages at remarriage of di
vorced men and women have also steadily increased, but the ages are, of course,
much lower. The average (mean) ages increased from 36.7 in 1 970 to 37.3 in
1983 for men and from 32.8 in 1970 to 33.7 in 1983 for women. Id., tbl. 4, at 24.
In 1 983, the average intervals between becoming widowed and remarriage for
the 65-and-older age group were 3.6 years for men and 7.9 years for women. The
average intervals between divorce and remarriage for the same age group were
6.3 years for men and 10.4 years for women. Id. at 1 3.
Within the 65-and-older population, 2.62% of divorced men and .05% of di
vorced women remarried during 1983. During that same year, 1 .68% of wid
owed men age 65 and older and .02% of women age 65 and older remarried.
Within the divorced population ages 60 to 64 for that same year, 4.93% of di
vorced men and 1 .29% of divorced women remarried; figures were not given for
the widowed population ages 60 to 64 for that or any other year. The remarriage
rates within the 65-and-older divorced and widowed segments of the population
have been treading downward, but not in a straight line. The data show peaks
and valleys over the course of the 1 970-83 period. The peak occurred during the
year 1 975, when 3. 14% of divorced men, .09 1 % of divorced women, 1 .95% of
widowed men, and .02 1 % of widowed women remarried. Data for 1 975 for the
60 to 64 years age group were not reported. /d., Table 3, at 23.
These marriage rates, of course, do not reveal the remarriage rates of divorced
or widowed men and women age 65 and older or 60 to 64; they merely reveal the
remarriage rates for a given year. Because such remarriages accumulate within
the population, the incidence of remarriage later in life appears to be significant.
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umented in the elective-share case law.67 In a case like that of
Wilma and Sam - the short-term, late-in-life marriage, which
produces no children -, a decedent who for all intents and pur
poses disinherits the surviving spouse may not be acting so much
from malice or spite toward the surviving spouse, but from a felt
higher obligation to the children of his or her former, long-term
marriage.
2.

I MPLEMENTING THE P ARTNERSHIP THEORY

The stage is now set for rethinking elective-share law. Without
a theory to support it, conventional elective-share law is untena
ble. This alone does not necessarily make it vulnerable to change.
Unsatisfactory though it may be, it will likely remain in place
unless a viable system is brought forth to replace it.
The system that, in time, seems sure to replace it is one that
implements the partnership theory of marriage. The pressure to
bring elective-share law into line with the partnership theory can
only increase. Spurred by the Uniform Marital Property Act and
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the 1 990 revisions of the
Uniform Probate Code are now in place to offer a means of re
pairing elective-share law.
It is one thing to speak of implementing the partnership theory
and another thing to work out a model for doing it. In seeking to
implement the partnership theory, the Joint Editorial Board con
sidered three possible approaches. The first was to use the
UMDA's equitable-distribution system for divorce law, z: e. to ex
tend that system into the area of the elective share. The second
67. See W. Macdonald, Fraud on the Widow's Share 1 56-57 (1 960). Of the
elective-share cases in the law reports up to the time of writing and in which the
author could identify the relationships, more than half pitted children of a former
marriage against a later spouse.
Statistically, "on average, women ending first marriages had 1 .06 children
under 1 8 years, those ending second marriages had 0.64 children, and those end
ing third marriages had 0.36 children. These differences are due at least in part to
the fact that most children are born into first marriages and may not be men
tioned on divorce records of subsequent marriages unless custody becomes an
issue." U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, supra note 66, at 3.
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was to adopt a community-property system similar to the
UMPA, except that it would attach only at death. The third, the
one adopted, was to establish an accrual system that would ap
proximate a fifty/fifty split of marital assets.
Because I have already written about the pros and cons of each
approach in the Iowa Law Review,68 and because a somewhat
more extensive treatment appears in the Real Property, Probate,
and Trust Joumal,69 I will not go into a lengthy discussion of the
JEB's analysis here. Briefly, the idea of extending the equitable
distribution system into the area of elective-share law was re
jected because of the discretionary and unpredictable nature of
the results under that system. Also, unlike the divorce context,
where both parties are still alive and can testify, only the survi
vor's side of the story can be told in the elective-share context.
The idea of imposing a deferred community-property elective
share seemed a far better approach. Under this approach, the
surviving spouse would have a right to claim a 50% share of that
portion of the couple's combined assets that were acquired during
the marriage other than by gift or inheritance. The disadvantage
of this system is that it requires post-death classification of the
couple's property to determine which is community and which is
separate. Over a marriage of any length, much property that was
separate property is likely to be commingled to such an extent
that tracing to its source would prove administratively difficult. 70
Unlike their community-property counterparts, marital partners
68. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights under the
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 223 ( 1 99 1).
69. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised
Uniform Probate Code, 26 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 683 (1 992).
70. See, e.g., I. Quinn, supra note 46, at 8 1 -82. Speaking of married partners
in which both have paychecks, the author writes:
Poolers put all the money into a common pot. Splitters keep their own sepa
rate accounts. Which you choose is a matter of soul, not of finance. Poolers
think that sharing is what a marriage is all about. Splitters hold to their own
independence within the marriage. The previously married often split but
sometimes pool. The first-time married often pool but sometimes split. It's
so unpredictable that even your best friend might surprise you. Over time,
and if the marriage goes well, splitters usually turn into spoolers, splitting

36

in title-based states are not put on notice regarding the risk in
volved in not maintaining adequate records. The administrative
difficulty is also arguably greater in the elective-share context
than in the divorce context, where by definition the duration of
the marriage is shorter than it would have been had the marriage
ended in disinheritance at death. Finally, it is important to un
derstand that, to the extent that presumptions would have to be
imposed to resolve close questions, a deferred community-prop
erty elective-share system would not yield an accurate result
anyway. 71
I n the end, the UPC adopted a more mechanical system that
implements the partnership theory by approximation.72 The
UPC's system, which can be called an accrual-type elective share,
seeks to establish an administratively simple system that approxi
mates the results that would be achieved by a 50/50 split of mari
tal assets. Under community law, each spouse from the first
moment of the marriage has a right to 50% of the couple's assets
that are acquired during the marriage other than by gift or inheri
tance. The hitch of course is that in the first moments of the
marriage, little or no such property exists. Growth of each
spouse's community-property entitlement occurs over time as the
marriage continues and property is acquired and accumulated;
some, pooling some, and growing less antsy about who pays for what. (Em
phasis in original.)
Of married partners in which only one has a paycheck, the author writes: "Split
ting is out. Pooling is in. "
7 1 . See Levy, A n Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 Fam. L.Q. 1 47,
1 52-53 (1 989) (noting, in the context of equitable-distribution law, that "the
stronger the presumption [in favor of characterizing all property as marital prop
erty], the less likely it will be that the spouse who owned nonmarital property at
marriage or received some during the marriage will try to trace the property or
funds;" and that the weaker the presumption, the more likely it will be that trac
ing issues will be litigated.).
72. The UPC's redesigned elective-share system has been endorsed by the
Executive Board and by the Assembly of the National Association of Women
Lawyers.
For a proposal that divorce law utilize an accrual-type system for division of
assets, see Sugarman Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in Divorce Reform
at the Crossroads 1 30, 1 59-60 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1 990).
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each spouse's 50% share is applied to an upwardly-trending ac
cumulation of assets.
The UPC's approximation system operates the other way
around. Formally, it does not distinguish between property ac
quired during the marriage and other property, but compensates
for this informally by applying an upwardly-trending percentage
to the couple's assets whenever and however acquired. Thus the
accrual schedule translates into a system that approximates the
amount of marital versus separate property in marriages of vari
ous lengths. After five years of marriage, for example, each
spouse's elective-share percentage is 15%, which is meant to rep
resent 50% of the marital-assets portion of the couple's property.
By approximation, this means that 30% of the couple's combined
assets are treated as having been acquired during the marriage
and 70% not. After ten years of marriage, the elective-share per
centage is 30%, which in effect treats 60% of the assets as having
been acquired during the marriage. After fifteen years of mar
riage and beyond, the elective-share percentage peaks out at 50%,
which in effect treats all of the assets as marital assets from that
point forward.
The advantage of the UPC system is that it avoids the adminis
trative difficulties of post-death classification and tracing-to
source that would be endemic to a deferred-community elective
share. The trade off is that it does what its name implies - it
approximates. No approximation system will give precisely accu
rate results in each given case. We have reason to believe, how
ever, that the UPC system gives reasonably accurate results in
nearly all cases and caution again that the other system, the de
ferred-community system, does not give results that are as accu
rate as you might think. 73
Whether implemented by approximation, as in the UPC, or by
a deferred-community elective share, a partnership-based elective
share has two main consequences: ( 1) it equalizes assets in a
73. See Waggoner, supra note 69, at 741 - 42.
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longer-term marriage; and (2) it reduces or eliminates the
spouse's claim in short-term, late-in-life marriages. The conven
tional elective share of one-third of the decedent's estate does not
reward the surviving spouse sufficiently in most instances of long
term marriages and over-rewards the surviving spouse in short
term, late-in-life marriages that usually involve a widow and wid
ower with children by their prior marriages.
To illustrate this last point, let's return to Wilma and Sam and
apply the UPC system to their late-in-life marriage. Recall that
each carne out of their main marriages with about $300,000 in
assets. This having been a marriage that lasted fi v e years, the
elective-share percentage prescribed in the statute is 15%.74
Sam's elective-share entitlement is $90,000 ( 15% of their com
bined assets of $600,000). But this does not mean that Sam has a
$90,000 claim against Wilma's estate. Thirty percent of Sam's
own $300,000 in assets (double the elective-share percentage)
count in fulfilling Sam's elective-share amount. Since 30% of
Sam's assets is $90,000, there is no deficiency and hence no claim
to any of Wilma's assets.
Although this approach does not eliminate the desirability of a
premarital agreement in second marriages, it does make such an
agreement less essential by removing the disincentive to remar
riage on the part of older widows and widowers that conventional
elective-share systems now impose. When an older widow and
widower - each financially independent and each with adult
children by the prior, main marriage - want to get married, a
concern that often arises is that the survivor of the two will take a
large portion of the other's property and deprive the decedent's
children of their inheritance. As the financial journalist, Jane
Bryant Quinn, said in a recent book:
[When older people remarry,] your friends wiii be enchanted. But
don't be surprised if your children aren't. It's usually not the
"pater" they worry about, but the patrimony. If your new spouse
gets your property after your death, he or she is free to cut your

74. See VPC § 2-20 l (a) ( 1 990).

39
children out. Even if you own assets separately, state inheritance
laws [referring to elective-share laws, not intestacy laws] usually re
quire that the spouse get one-third to one-half. 75

A partnership-based elective share serves to remove that concern.
3.

NEED TO S UPPLEMENT PARTNERSHIP E LECTIVE
SHARE WITH A S UPPORT THEORY ELEMENT

As sensible as the partnership theory is, it is not sufficient by
itself to "do right" by all surviving spouses. One persistent criti
cism of the partnership theory as applied to divorce law is that it
often leaves divorced women without an adequate means of sup
port.76 This is because the traditional division of labor within a
marriage allows the husband to devote his energy to his career
while the wife devotes her energy to what the economists call
"household production." An equal division of assets saved dur
ing the marriage still leaves the divorced wife far behind in earn
ing power after a divorce than she would have been had she
devoted her energy during the marriage to a career. 77 This criti
cism of divorce law does not apply, of course, to all divorced
spouses, but mainly to those who come out of the failed marriage
with diminished work skills.
The problem is, if anything, more endemic to elective-share
law, where the surviving spouse is typically beyond working
years. One of the theories traditionally thought to underlie elec75. J. Quinn, supra note 46, at 83.
76. See, e.g. , L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social
and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America Ch. 7 ( 1985);
Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching Solutions to
the Mystery, 23 Fam. L.Q. 253, 27 1 n. 65 ( 1989); McLindon, Separate But Une
qual: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 2 1 Fam. L.Q.
3 5 1 , 352, 391-92 ( 1987); Rhode & Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning
the Reforms, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads 1 9 1 , 201-04 (S. Sugarman &
H. Kay eds. 1 990); Smith, The Partnership Theory ofMarriage: A Borrowed Solu
tion Fails, 68 Texas L. Rev. 689 ( 1 990); Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests
on Divorce, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads 1 30 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay
eds. 1 990). But see S. Faludi, Backlash 1 -35 ( 1 99 1).
77. See Stake, Fostering Private Ordering by Forcing Parties to Bargain: A
Matrimonial Mandate to Deal with Divorce, 2 L. Rev. J. 1 , 5-12 ( 1 99 1).
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tive-share law involves a post-death duty of support, that is, that
the spouses' mutual duties of support during their joint lifetimes
should be continued in some form after death in favor of the sur
vivor, as a claim on the decedent's estate.
Conventional elective-share law implements this theory poorly.
The fixed fraction, whether it is the typical one-third or some
other fraction, disregards the survivor's actual need. A one-third
share may be inadequate to the surviving spouse's needs, espe
cially in a modest estate. On the other hand, in a very large es
tate, it may go far beyond the survivor's needs. In either a
modest or a large estate, the survivor may or may not have ample
independent means, and this factor, too, is disregarded in conven
tional elective-share law, as it is in intestacy law. The problem is
not addressed in intestacy law because intestacy affects so many
estates of small size. Elective-share law can accommodate a more
individuated system, however, because elections are the exception
in estate practice.
The 1990 UPC's elective-share system, therefore, seeks to im
plement the support theory by granting the survivor a supplemen
tal elective-share amount related to the survivor's actual needs.
In implementing a support rationale, the length of the marriage is
quite irrelevant. Because the duty of support is founded upon
status, it arises at the time of the marriage.
The revised UPC implements the support theory by providing
a supplemental elective-share amount of $50,000. 78 This feature
is not like the lump-sum device used in intestacy law. Here, the
surviving spouse's own title-based ownership interests, amounts
shifting to the survivor at the decedent's death, and amounts ow
ing to the survivor from the decedent's estate under the accrual
type elective-share apparatus discussed above are counted first to
ward making up this $50,000 amount. (Amounts going to the
survivor under the Code's probate exemptions and allowances79
and the survivor's Social Security and other governmental bene78. 1 990 UPC § 2-20l (b).
79. See note 43 supra.

41
fits are not counted, however.) Only if the survivor's assets and
entitlements are less than the $50,000 minimum is the survivor
entitled to whatever additional portion of the decedent's estate is
necessary, up to 100% of it, to bring the survivor's assets and
entitlements up to that minimum level. 80
If there could be any complaint about this feature of the UPC
system, it would be that the $50,000 figure is too low. With aver
age social security payments added in, $50,000 at current interest
rates will generate an income stream of only $723 a month
($8,676 a year), which is only $200 a month above the poverty
level. The figure of $50,000 is given in brackets in the Code,
which means that any state is invited to supply a different figure if
it so chooses. A somewhat higher figure might be quite
appropriate.
4.

P ROTECTION AGAINST W ILL S UBSTITUTES

I would now like to turn to another feature of elective-share
law. Conventional statutes grant the surviving spouse a right to
elect a fractional share of the decedent's "estate." In our par
lance, the term "estate" normally means the probate estate, i. e. ,
the property owned at death and included in the gross estate for
estate tax purposes under IRC section 2033.
One of the most troublesome issues under these "estate" stat
utes is the extent to which spousal elective-share rights extend to
will substitutes. An elective share is just as ineffective if it applies
only to the decedent's probate estate as the federal transfer taxes
would be if there were no gift tax and the estate tax only con
tained section 2033. The elective-share system would serve only
as a blueprint for evasion.
A.

COMMON-LAW

T HEORIES

"Estate" statutes shift to the judicial system the task of breath
ing integrity into the elective share. In the earlier part of this
80. 1990 UPC § 2-207(b), (c).
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century, the courts only halfheartedly rose to the occasion, by
adopting one or the other of two approaches: the fraudulent-in
tent test or the illusory-transfer test. The illusory-transfer test is
the predominant view. The leading case adopting the illusory
transfer test is Newman v. Dore, 8 1 a New York case that arose in
the late 1930s. In that case, Ferdinand Straus, an eighty-year-old
testator, executed trust agreements by which he transferred all his
real and personal property to his trustees. The trust agreements
were executed three days before his death and when cross actions
for dissolution of his marriage were pending. The terms of the
trusts reserved to Straus the right to the income for life, the
power to revoke the trusts, and the power to control the trustees
in all aspects of the trusts' administration; needless to say,
Straus's wife of four years, a woman in her thirties, received no
beneficial interest in these trusts. In holding that the trusts were
part of Straus's estate for purposes of his widow's rights, the New
York Court of Appeals "judged [the trust] by the substance, not
by the form." Under this test, "the testator's conveyance is illu
sory, intended only as a mask for the effective retention by the
settlor of the property which in form he had conveyed."
Although it was by no means the first case to have formulated
this general approach, 82 the decision in Newman v. Dore had sub
stantial influence on the law in other states. 83 Although promis
ing in theory, the illusory-transfer doctrine of Newman v. Dore
has, for the most part, given the surviving spouse very limited
8 1 . 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1 937).
82. In Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 594 ( 1 8 50), the court observed that
it was "not at all material by what motive the husband was actuated in making
the disposition of his property." However, the right given the surviving spouse by
the election statute was one that "the husband cannot defeat by any contrivance
for that purpose: . . . . Whatever may be the form of the transaction, if the
substance of it be a testamentary disposition, it cannot be effectual in relation to
the wife. If this were otherwise, the statute might be rendered a dead letter at the
volition of the husband."
83. In New York, the ruling of the case has been superseded by comprehen
sive legislation that protects the surviving spouse against specified will substi
tutes. See N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5 - 1 . 1 .
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protection against will substitutes. 84 Among the courts accepting
the doctrine, one of the most common will substitutes of all, the
revocable trust with a retained life estate, has been held not to be
illusory. 85 There was even some doubt that a Totten trust is illu
sory under the illusory-transfer test. 8 6
A breakthrough finally occurred in the important 1984 Massa
chusetts decision of Sullivan v. Burkin. 87 In an opinion written
by Justice Herbert Wilkins, the court held that assets held in a
revocable inter-vivos trust created during the marriage88 is part of
the estate in determining the surviving spouse's elective share.
84. The comprehensive work in the field is W. Macdonald, Fraud on the
Widow's Share ( 1 960). See also Schuyler, Revocable Trusts - Spouses, Creditors
and Other Predators, 1 974 Inst. on Est. Plan. ch. 1 3 ; Annots., 63 A.L.R.4th 1 173
( 1988); 49 A.L.R.2d 521 ( 1956); Reporter's Note, Restatement (Second) of Prop
erty (Donative Transfers) § 1 3.7, at 101- 1 1 ( 1986).
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 1 85 (Ill. 1978)
(see also Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1 10 1/2 § 601); Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E.2d 185
(Mass. 1945) (prospectively overruled in Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572
(Mass. 1 984); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 1 6 1 A. 72 1 (Pa. 1 932);
see Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 379 S.E.2d 761 (W.Va. 1989); Re
statement (Second) of Trusts § 57 cmt. c ( 1 959). In a 1944 Ohio decision, such a
trust was held ineffective against the claim of a surviving spouse, Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co., 58 N.E.2d 3 8 1 (Ohio 1 944), but the decision was later overruled in
Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 1 79 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1 96 1).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Maine seemed to indicate that a
revocable trust with a retained life estate might be "illusory" under the illusory
transfer doctrine. See Staples v. King, 433 A.2d 407 (Me. 1 98 1). Maine subse
quently enacted the augmented-estate concept of the pre-1990 UPC.
86. Compare Matter of Halpern, 100 N.E.2d 1 20 (N.Y. 195 1) and Jeruzal's
Estate v. Jeruzal, 1 30 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. 1 964), with Montgomery v. Michaels,
301 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 1 973).
87. 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1 984).
88. The facts in the case were that, in September, 1973, Ernest G. Sullivan
executed a deed of trust under which he transferred real estate to himself as sole
trustee. The net income of the trust was payable to him during his life and the
trustee was instructed to pay to him all or such part of the principal of the trust
estate as he might request in writing from time to time. He retained the right to
revoke the trust at any time. On his death, the successor trustee was directed to
pay the principal and any undistributed income equally to George F. Cronin, Sr.,
and Harold J. Cronin, if they should survive him, which they did.
The husband died on April 27, 1 9 8 1 , while still trustee of the inter-vivos trust.
He left a will in which he stated that he "intentionally neglected to make any
provision for my wife, Mary A. Sullivan and my grandson, Mark Sullivan. " He
directed that, after the payment of debts, expenses, and all estate taxes levied by
reason of his death, the residue of his estate should be paid over to the trustee of
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The court engaged in the frequently applied Massachusetts prac
tice of prospective overruling, so that the new rule was not applied
to the Sullivan case itself. For the future, however, the court held
that "as to any inter vivos trust created or amended after the date
of this opinion, we announce that the estate of a decedent . . .
shall include the value of assets held in an inter vivos trust cre
ated by the deceased spouse as to which the deceased spouse
alone retained the power during his or her life to direct the dispo
sition of those trust assets for his or her benefit, as, for example,
by the exercise of a power of appointment or by revocation of the
trust. Such a power would be a general power of appointment for
Federal estate tax purposes . . . and a "general power" as defined
in the Restatement (Second) of Property . . . ." More signifi
cantly, the court also noted: "What we have announced as a rule
for the future hardly resolves all the problems that may arise."
The court then ticked off a laundry list of undecided questions,
questions whose resolution await future case-by-case adjudica
tion.89 Citing the Uniform Probate Code, the court added that
"The question . . . is one that can best be handled by legislation."
the inter-vivos trust. George F. Cronin, Sr., and Harold J. Cronin were named
coexecutors of the will.
Ernest and Mary had been separated for many years. At his death, Ernest
owned personal property worth approximately $ 1 5 ,000 . The only asset in the
trust was a house in Boston, which was sold after his death for approximately
$85,000 .
89. In full, the court's statement was:
There may be a different rule if some or all of the trust assets were conveyed
to such a trust by a third person. . . . We have not, of course, dealt with a
case in which the power of appointment is held jointly with another person.
If the surviving spouse assented to the creation of the inter vivos trust, per
haps the rule we announce would not apply. We have not discussed which
assets should be used to satisfy a surviving spouse's claim. We have not
discussed the question whether a surviving spouse's interest in the intestate
estate of a deceased spouse should reflect the value of assets held in an inter
vivos trust created by the intestate spouse over which he or she had a gen
eral power of appointment. That situation and the one before us, however,
do not seem readily distinguishable. A general power of appointment over
assets in a trust created by a third person is said to present a different situa
tion. Restatement (Second) of Property, Supplement to Tent. Draft No. 5,
reporter's note to § 1 3 . 7 at 29 (1 982). Nor have we dealt with other assets
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B.

A UGMENTED- EsTATE LEGISLATION

It seems clear that courts will now be more and more inclined
to protect surviving spouses against disinheritance by will substi
tute. This movement, begun by Sullivan, can only be boosted by
the adoption of a similar approach published in 1986 and 1992 in
the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers).90
If this is the case, then it would seem to be far preferable to
enact legislation along the lines of the augmented-estate concept
of the Uniform Probate Code or some similar model and be done
with it, so that estate planners know what the rules are. Other
wise, the rules will be developed on a case-by-case basis and it
may take years or decades before the full scope of the spouse's
protection becomes clarified in a particular jurisdiction.
Under the UPC, the surviving spouse's elective-share percent
age is applied to the augmented estate. The augmented estate
serves two basic functions. By combining the couple's assets, it
plays a crucial part under the 1990 Code in implementing the
partnership theory. The other function is to provide a means of
protecting the spouse against evasion by will substitute. To these
ends, the augmented estate consists of the sum of the values of
four components: (1) the decedent's net probate estate; (2) the
decedent's reclaimable estate; (3) property to which the surviving
spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's death other than
from the decedent's probate estate; and (4) property owned by the
surviving spouse and amounts that would have been included in
not passing by will, such as a trust created before the marriage or insurance
policies over which a deceased spouse had control.
460 N.E.2d at 577-78.
90. Section 34. 1 of the Restatement provides:

Sullivan,

(3) An inter vivos donative transfer to others than the donor's spouse that
is a substitute for a will, or that is revocable by the donor at the time of the
donor's death, is subject to spousal rights of the donor's spouse in the trans
ferred property that would accrue to the donor's spouse on the donor's
death if the transfer had been made by the donor's will.
id. § 1 3.7, the comment to which states that this provision is not re
stricted to transfers that took place during the marriage.

See also
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the surviving spouse's reclaimable estate had the spouse prede
ceased the decedent.
The function of protecting the spouse against evasion by will
substitute is performed by the reclaimable-estate component of
the augmented estate. The concept of providing in the statute
itself a list of will substitutes to be subjected to the surviving
spouse's elective share9 1 was pioneered by legislation in New
York and Pennsylvania and adopted by the pre-1990 UPC.
The 1990 UPC revisions sought to strengthen the reclaimable
estate component. The pre-1990 version contained several loop
holes. The most important of these was life insurance that the
decedent purchased, naming someone other than his or her
spouse as the beneficiary. Under the 1990 revision, proceeds of
these policies are included in the reclaimable estate.
The other important feature of the 1990 revision is that the
reclaimable estate now includes property that is subject to a pres
ently exercisable general power of appointment held solely by the
decedent. 92 Such powers are viewed as substantively indistin
guishable from outright ownership. The power need not have
been created by the decedent and need not have been conferred
on or retained by the decedent during the marriage. The dece
dent need only have held the power immediately prior to his or
her death or have exercised or released the power in favor of
someone other than the decedent, the decedent's estate, or the
decedent's spouse while married to the spouse and during the
two-year period next preceding the decedent's death.
9 1 . The UPC's list is contained in § 2-202(b)(2).
92. The term "presently exercisable general power of appointment" is a de
fined term and includes a reserved power of revocation in a revocable trust. See
Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) § 1 1 . 1 cmt. c & illus. 5
( 1 986); Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984).
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IV.

W HO IS A SPOUSE?

For the fourth and final segment of this lecture, I should like to
discuss a question you might not immediately think is a question
- who qualifies as a "spouse"?
The rights we have been discussing are granted to the person
who holds the status of spouse. Spousal status is what grants the
person a right to an intestate share and the right to elect a forced
share if dissatisfied with the decedent's estate plan. Spousal status
is also what grants original ownership of half the property ac
quired during the marriage in the community-property states.
Pinning these rights on status is not only beneficial to the spouse,
but also efficient for society. It means that spouses can claim
these rights without having to prove anything about the underly
ing details or commitment of their relationships.93
The mar
riage certificate itself qualifies the person for what the law allows.
93. A few states, by statute, bar the surviving spouse from taking for deser
tion or adultery. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 392.090 (spouse barred if spouse "leaves
the other and lives in adultery," unless the spouses "afterward become reconciled
and live together as husband and wife"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 560: 1 9 (spouse
barred "if at the time of the death of either husband or wife, the decedent was
justifiably living apart from the surviving husband or wife because such survivor
was or had been guilty of conduct which constitutes cause for divorce"); N.Y.
Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5 - 1 .2 (spouse barred if spouse "abandoned the de
ceased spouse, and such abandonment continued until the time of death" or if the
spouse "who, having the duty to support the other spouse, failed or refused to
provide for such spouse though he or she had the means or ability to do so,
unless such marital duty was resumed and continued until the death of the
spouse having the need of support"); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2 106 (spouse barred
"who, for one year or upwards previous to the death of the other spouse, has
wilfully neglected or refused to perform the duty to support the other spouse, or
who for one year or upwards has wilfully and maliciously deserted the other
spouse"); Va. Code § 64. 1 -23 (spouse barred if spouse "wilfully desert[s] or aban
don[s] his or her consort and such desertion or abandonment continues until the
death of the consort"). See also Haw. Rev. Stat. § 533-9.
A few courts, without statutory authority to vary the rights provided to surviv
ing spouses, have denied claims against decedents' estates by persons who were
lawfully married to the decedents when they died. See, e.g. , Estate of Abila, 1 97
P.2d 10 (Cal. 1 948) (wife barred because interlocutory decree of divorce, granted
to decedent before his death, terminated decedent's obligation of support, though
it did not dissolve the marriage).
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As my final topic, I want to turn to the situation of the unmar
ried cohabitor or domestic partner. Unmarried cohabitors or do
mestic partners lack marital status and hence the automatic
rights granted to spouses.
When a domestic partner dies, the status law grants the surviv
ing partner none of the rights surveyed in the first three parts of
this lecture. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent's surviv
ing partner receives no intestate share and receives no right to
elect against the decedent's will. Intestate-succession law gives a
surviving spouse a large intestate share on the theory of imputed
or attributed intent - the law deduces that most decedents (as
suming a sound marriage) would have wanted to leave everything
to the survivor or at least a substantial enough portion to give the
survivor economic security. Regarding unmarried couples, the
law grants the survivor no share at all; the omission treats the
surviving partner as no more a natural object of the decedent's
bounty than a complete stranger. Elective-share law gives a dis
inherited surviving spouse a right to a certain fraction of the dece
dent's property, whether the decedent wanted the survivor to
have anything or not. The claim is based on either a right to
support or a financial partnership theory or, more conventionally,
a carryover from common-law dower. Regarding unmarried
couples, the law grants the survivor no right against being disin
herited, thus treating the surviving partner as having contributed
nothing to the decedent's wealth.
Who are these domestic partners and what do we know about
them? Actually, we are beginning to know a fair amount.94 As
of 1990, according to Census Bureau estimates, there were nearly
94. Much of the demographic information in the following pages is drawn
from Sweet & Bumpass, Disruption of Marital and Cohabitation Relationships: A
Social-Demographic Perspective, Working Paper No. 32 (Nat'l Survey of Families
and Households, 1990); Bumpass, What's Happening to the Family? Interactions
Between Demographic and Institutional Change, 27 Demography 483 ( 1 990);
Bumpass, Sweet & Cherlin, The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Mar
riage, Working Paper No. 5 (Nat'l Survey of Families and Households, 1 989).
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3 million cohabiting couples in the United States,95 as compared
with only about 450,000 such couples in 1960. The number of
these arrangements increased significantly in the 1970s and 80s
and continues to increase in the 90s. Of course, the term "cohab
iting couple" is itself indeterminate. Is it restricted to couples
whose only household is their shared one? Or, does it also in
clude other, less clear examples such as the yuppie who has an
apartment but lives for days, weeks, or months on end at the
other's apartment? The statistics we have count only those who
share a single household.
Although at the current time, only 4% of all Americans age 19
and older are cohabiting, the percentage is far higher at the
younger ages. In the age 19 to 34 category, about one in seven
never-married and about one in four formerly married persons
are currently cohabiting. As might be expected, the rates are
lower for middle-aged and older people. Fewer than 5% of un
married persons in their SO's and about 1% of those 60 and older
are cohabiting.
In recent years, about 42% of those marrying for the first time
cohabited at some time prior to their marriage, mostly with their
first spouse only, and about three-fifths of those entering second
marriages cohabited between their first and second marriages.
The most important statistic for spousal-rights law is that for
most people cohabitation is a temporary or short-term state. The
parties either break up or get married fairly quickly. By about
one and one-half years, half the cohabiting couples have either
married or broken up. Only about 10% remain cohabiting after
five years. This does not mean, however, that at any point in time
there exist only a few longer-term or marriage-like cohabitations.
The longer-term cohabitations tend to accumulate in the popula
tion. Twenty percent of cohabiting couples, in fact, have lived
together for five or more years. Many are gay or lesbian couples
for whom marriage is not an option. But most are heterosexual
95. See Newsweek, March 23, 1 992, at 62.
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couples who, for one reason or another, remain together without
marrying. The duration of cohabiting unions is longer among
persons previously married. Also, children are more frequently
present in such unions than you might think. Demographers
have reported that children are present in 40% of cohabiting
households. This breaks down to one-third of the never-married
householders and almost half of the previously married house
holders. More significantly,
one-sixth of never-married cohabiting couples have a child that was
born since they began living together. . . . [T]his represents a signif
icant component of unmarried births (about a quarter) that are not
born into single-parent households.
Further, the children in cohabiting households are not all young
children . . . . [A] quarter of the households with children have chil
dren age 10 or older; mostly living with previously-married parents.
In thinking about the meaning of cohabitation and the dynamics of
cohabiting households, it is critical to keep in mind that issues of
parenting and step-parenting are very much a part of the picture. 96

The longer-term cohabitations are the ones that tend to find
their way into the legal system. Like married couples, this hap
pens upon disinheritance at death or, more commonly, the delib
erate decision of one of the parties to terminate the relationship.
The unmarried-cohabitors cases that come to public attention
nearly always involve a defendant who is a wealthy celebrity, en
tertainer, or professional athlete. But the less celebrated come to
court also. As a Houston divorce attorney remarked: "You don't
need millions of dollars for people to fight. Give two people a
house worth $200,000 and they'll consider an action. "97
These suits are sometimes grounded on a common-law mar
riage claim, but, when that claim is unavailable, because the state
does not recognize common-law marriages or because the ar
rangement does not fit within the criteria, they can still go for96. Bumpass, Sweet & Cherlin, supra note 94, at 10.
97. Taylor, Increased Mobility Adds to Common Law Claims, Nat'! L.J.,
Aug. 14, 1 989, at 24.
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ward as a "palimony suit."98 Not surprisingly, as I said, most of
the cases arise in the context of a dissolution during life. Claims
arising at death are less common because, if the partners remain
devoted to one another, the surviving partner is probably pro
vided for in the decedent's will or other parts of the estate plan. 99
Therefore, it is less usual for cases to arise in which a surviving
partner is making a claim to a share of a decedent's estate, but
such cases do arise. 100
98. The term "palimony" is misleading because the plaintiff is usually seek
ing a division of the couple's property, not an award of periodic payments similar
to alimony.
99. In speaking of the power of testation, Jeremy Bentham noted that "a
man . . . should have the means of cultivating the hopes and rewarding the care
of . . . a woman who, but for the omission of a ceremony, would be called his
widow . . . . " J. Bentham, supra note 3, at 1 85-86.
See generally, however, deFuria, Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Meretri
cious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 200 ( 1989) ("[Although only] a few courts [raise] a rebuttable presumption
of undue influence . . . whenever the testator willed his estate to a meretricious
partner . . . , [m]any more courts emphasized that such a relationship raised a
significant suspicion of undue influence, which would be closely scrutinized.");
Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 225
( 1 9 8 1 ) ("[T]here is at least some evidence to suggest that a homosexual testator
who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to his lover stands in greater risk of having
his testamentary plans overturned than does a heterosexual testator who be
queaths the bulk of his estate to a spouse or lover."); Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 743
(1 977).
I 00. Although most of the cases have involved property disputes between liv
ing cohabitors who have separated, some cases have involved contractual or equi
table claims by the survivor to a share of the other's estate upon the latter's
death. Complaints founded upon breach of oral promises supported by social,
domestic, nursing, and business services have been held to state a cause of action.
See, e.g. , Poe v. Estate of Levy, 4 1 1 S.2d 253 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing trial
court's dismissal of count seeking enforcement of an express support contract
and count seeking imposition of a constructive trust in certain property due to a
confidential relationship between surviving cohabitor and decedent, but affirming
trial court's dismissal of count seeking one-half ownership interest in decedent's
property grounded on argument that their relationship had the same force and
effect as a legal marriage); Donovan v. Scuderi, 443 A.2d 1 2 1 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1 982) (plaintiff entitled to recover damages for breach of express oral prom
ise to pay to plaintiff 1 ,000 shares of stock of the bank of which the decedent was
chairman of the board, in return for which plaintiff made various expenditures
and provided loans and services, including "catering services, personal shopping
services (clothing, furniture and furnishings)"; decedent, a married man, and
plaintiff, an unmarried woman, did not have a full-time cohabitation relationship,
but frequently used an apartment plaintiff had obtained at decedent's request);
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Plaintiffs seem to have no problem in stating a cause of action
when they allege that they made a financial contribution toward
the purchase of specific property on the understanding that they
would be the owner or part owner. The fact that the property
was not titled in the plaintiff's name is not a defense. A cause of
action for the imposition of a purchase-money resulting trust or a
constructive trust on the specific property is well established. 1 0 1
But what i f the plaintiff's contribution came in the form o f do
mestic services? The case that has received the most notoriety is
Marvin v. Marvin. 102 The Marvin case was one of the first cases
to confront the problem of remedy in a domestic-services case.
Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595 (Mich. Ct. App. 1 973) (surviving cohabitor
entitled to specific performance of decedent's oral promise to convey house to
her; plaintiff, a married woman who was separated from her husband, performed
various domestic, social, and nursing services for decedent).
Complaints have also been held to state a cause of action when they sought the
imposition of a constructive trust on specific property based on a confidential
relationship between the cohabitors. See, e.g. , Poe v. Estate of Levy, supra.
Complaints seeking damages in the amount of the value of such services on the
theory of quantum meruit (as much as the plaintiff deserved) have also been
upheld. See, e.g. , Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 69 1 (Mass. 1 975) (surviving
cohabitor entitled to quantum meruit recovery of damages for value of social,
domestic, and business services performed in reliance on decedent's oral promise
to leave a will devising his entire estate to her); Humiston v. Bushnell, 394 A.2d
844 (N.H. 1978) (lack of proof of alleged oral promise to devise a certain parcel
of realty prevented surviving cohabitor from recovering damages for breach; sur
viving cohabitor was entitled to recover in quantum meruit for value of "inti
mate, confidential, and dedicated personal and business service" she performed
for the decedent with the expectation of being ultimately compensated therefor);
Estate of Steffes, 290 N. W.2d 697 (Wis. 1 980) (surviving cohabitor entitled to
recover damages for value of housekeeping, farming, and nursing services ren
dered at decedent's request and with the expectation of being compensated there
for).
Also, complaints seeking the imposition of an implied partnership with respect
to a business arrangement have been upheld. See, e.g. , Estate of Thornton, 499
P.2d 864 (Wash. 1 972) (surviving cohabitor entitled to recover on basis of an
implied partnership in cattle-raising business). But the dismissal of a complaint
seeking a half interest in the decedent's property based on the theory that the
parties' relationship had the same force and effect as a legal marriage was af
firmed. See, e.g. , Poe v. Estate of Levy, supra.
1 0 1 . See, e.g. , Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 67 1 (Minn. 1 983) (surviving
cohabitor entitled to constructive trust in her favor of a one-half interest in home
purchased with joint funds but titled in decedent's name alone).
102. 557 P.2d 1 06 (Cal. 1 976)
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These are the cases in which the domestic partnership follows the
division-of-labor pattern of the traditional marriage. The plaintiff
specializes in "household production," an asset perhaps worth
something in the "remarriage market" after dissolution, but
worth little in the labor market. The defendant specializes in ca
reer advancement, a "divorce-proof " asset.
These plaintiffs, consequently, are entering a much riskier ven
ture than those entering a marriage with a similar division of la
bor. Those entering a marriage with a similar division of labor at
least have the divorce laws and the intestacy and elective-share or
community-property laws as back-up protection. Those entering
a nonmarital relationship have virtually no legal rights to fall
back on.
What can they do to protect themselves? One thing they can
do is to insist on protection by contract, just as married persons
use a premarital agreement. Academic lawyers tend to call this
"private ordering." The reality is, however, that in many of the
litigated cases, there is an enormous disparity of bargaining
power. By being older and already wealthy, the defendant is
often in a dominant position. For this reason, and because bar
gaining is done in the shadow of one's legal rights and the unmar
ried have virtually no back-up legal rights, the plaintiff is in a
"subordinate" position. If there is to be a contract, a written con
tract, the partner insisting on it is likely to be the dominant de
fendant, not the subordinate plaintiff.103 The contract is more
likely to take the form of what Bill Cantwell calls a "Non
Marvenizing" agreement, under which the subordinate plaintiff in
103. Premarital agreements are enforceable only if in writing. See Unif. Pre
marital Agreement Act § 2 ( 1 983) ("A premarital agreement must be in writing
and signed by both parties. It is enforceable without consideration.").
Legislation in Minnesota provides that an express written contract "between a
man and a woman who are living together . . . out of wedlock" is valid, even if
"sexual relations between the parties are contemplated," but also provides that,
in absence of an express written contract, any claim to another's earnings or
property must be dismissed as contrary to public policy if it is "based on the fact
that the individuals lived together in contemplation of sexual relations and out of
wedlock within or without this state." Minn. Stat. §§ 5 1 3 .075, .076.

54
effect waives all rights. 104 The plaintiff is likely just as frightened
to raise or press the subject of a contract as marriage. Plaintiffs
who do press the issue, at least to some extent, are more likely to
get vague oral statements than a written contract for their efforts.
Consequently, the plaintiff in many of the litigated cases alleges
an oral contract, which in the end may not be provable. The
Marvin case fell into this category. The plaintiff, Michelle Triola,
brought a breach of contract action against the defendant, Lee
Marvin. Because the trial court granted judgment on the plead
ings for the defendant, the question on appeal was whether the
plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action. The California
Supreme Court held that it did, but on remand Michelle could
not prove her allegation.
The facts alleged in Michelle's complaint were that in October
of 1964, she and Lee "entered into an oral agreement." As is
typical of these complaints, Michelle not only listed the domestic
services she agreed to perform but also the opportunities for em
ployment or training she agreed to forego. The services she listed
were "companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook."
Michelle's foregone opportunities were "her lucrative career as an
entertainer [and] singer." Lee, in tum, she alleged, not only
agreed "to share equally any and all property accumulated" dur
ing the cohabitation105 but also "to provide for all of [her] finan
cial support and needs for the rest of her life."
104. As reported in J. Quinn, supra note 46, at 84, Bill Cantwell's " Non
Marvenizing" Agreement, which would be suitable for parties of equal bargain
ing power, states:
We have decided to live together beginning on
. We do not intend that
any common law marriage should arise from this. We have not made any
promises to each other about economic matters. We do not intend any eco
nomic rights to arise from our relationship. If in the future we decide that
any promises of an economic nature should exist between us, we will put
them in writing, and only such written promises made by us in a written
memorandum signed by us in the future shall have any force between us.
.
Signed at
on
105. Michelle's actual allegation was that the parties agreed that "they would
combine their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property
accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or combined." But,
__

__

__
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Michelle and Lee lived together for about five and a half years
(from October 1964 through May 1970). During this period, she
alleged, the parties as a result of their efforts and earnings ac
quired in Lee's name substantial real and personal property, in
cluding motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May
1970, however, Lee (in the language of the complaint) "com
pelled" her to leave his household. He continued to support her
for another year and a half (until November 1971), but thereafter
refused to provide further support.
In a landmark decision, the California Supreme Court held
that her complaint stated a cause of action. There are two aspects
of the Marvin decision that I'd like to address. First is the ques
tion of whether an express contract is enforceable, assuming that
it can be proved if oral; second is whether the disappointed do
mestic partner has any rights at all if no express contract can be
proved.
A.

Enforceability of an Express Contract-the
"Meretricious" Consideration Problem

The principle obstacle to recovering for breach of an express
oral contract, other than the difficulty of proving the contract,
was what the courts call the "meretricious" nature of such a rela
tionship - that the relationship involved sexual intimacy. Be
cause prostitution is illegal, a contract for prostitution is
unenforceable. A few post-Marvin decisions in other states have
held that contracts between unmarried cohabitors are flat unen
forceable for that reason alone, citing public policy grounds. 1 06
Those decisions are still presumptively good law in those states.
since the complaint alleged that Michelle promised to remove herself from the
work force, it appears that it was Lee's earnings that were to be shared.
106. See, e.g. , Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 8 1 (Ga. 1 977) ("It is well settled
that neither a court of law nor a court of equity will lend its aid to either party to
a contract founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration. Code Ann. § 2050 1 . . . . The parties being unmarried and the appellant having admitted the fact
of cohabitation in both verified pleadings, this would constitute immoral consid
eration under Code Ann. § 20-501 . . . . ); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1 204
(Ill. 1 979) ("Illinois' public policy regarding agreements such as the one alleged
"
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The Marvin court sought to remove this obstacle to enforce
ment. The court held that the sexual component of the arrange
ment could prevent enforcement only if the contract were
"expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of
sexual services." 1 07 This was not the case in Marvin, for Michelle
did not allege that one of the services for which Lee agreed to pay
was for her to be Lee's lover.
The time has surely come to put the meretricious-consideration
argument behind us. It is surely time to remove it as any poten
tial obstacle at all to enforcement of these agreements, for there is
no way these cases involve agreements for prostitution. Perhaps
the Marvin court thought it had done that by making contracts
enforceable unless the contract was "expressly and inseparably"
based upon "sexual services." Nevertheless, in a subsequent Cali
fornia case, Jones v. Daly, 1 08 the plaintiff made the mistake of
alleging in his complaint that one of the services he agreed to
perform, in addition to domestic services, was to be the defend
ant's "lover. " This proved to be fatal, for the court held that the
complaint did not state a cause of action, citing the ground that
the plaintiff's "allegations clearly show that plaintiff's rendition
of sexual services to Daly was an inseparable part of the consider
ation for the 'cohabitors agreement,' and indeed was the predomi
nant consideration." "There is," the court said, "no severable
portion of the 'cohabitors agreement' supported by independent
consideration." 1 09
The solution came in a still later case, Whorton v. Dil/ing
ham. 1 1 0 The complaint in that case listed mutual sexual promises
here was implemented long ago . . . , where this court said: 'An agreement in
consideration of future illicit cohabitation between the plaintiffs is void.' . . . The
issue, realistically, is whether it is appropriate for this court to grant a legal status
to a private arrangement substituting for the institution of marriage sanctioned
by the State. The question whether change is needed in the law . . . [is best left to]
the legislative branch . . . ).
107. Marvin, 5 57 P.2d at 1 14.
108. 1 22 Cal. App. 3d 500, 1 76 Cal. Rptr. 1 30 ( 1 9 8 1 ).
109. /d. at 509, 1 76 Cal. Rptr. at 1 34.
1 1 0. 202 Cal. App. 3d 447, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 ( 1988).
"
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- that the plaintiff promised to be the defendant's "lover" and
that the defendant promised to be the plaintiff's "lover." The
court held the complaint stated a cause of action. In a key pas
sage, the court stated that "by itemizing the mutual promises to
engage in sexual activity, [the plaintiff] has not precluded the trier
of fact from finding those promises are the consideration for each
other and independent of the bargained for consideration for [the
plaintiff's] employment." I I I
It seems to me that the Whorton analysis suggests a responsible
way around this problem. Even if sexual intimacy is listed in the
complaint on only one side, surely the way to handle these cases
is to presume that the sexual component of a cohabitation is al
ways separable from the other parts of the contract, on the
ground - to be blunt - that the consideration for sex is sex.
B.

Rights of Domestic Partners Who are Not Protected
by a Provable Contract

What if the plaintiff entered upon a cohabitation arrangement
without contractual protection? In Marvin, Michelle did allege
an oral contract, but she was unable to prove it. Should plaintiffs
who never allege or cannot prove a contract ever receive relief?
Or, should the law say that they knew what they were getting
into, took the risk that it would not work out, and cannot now
cry foul when they lost the gamble and the arrangement later fell
apart? After all, they already got room and board, probably some
gifts, and, in general, probably lived a higher life style than they
could have afforded on their own. Is that not all they deserve?
This is the most important question in this developing area.
The courts in a few jurisdictions have closed the door to plaintiffs
without an express contract1 1 2 and at least one legislature has
I l l . /d. at 454, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 409- 10.
1 1 2. See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980); Estate of Alexan
der, 445 So.2d 836 (Miss. 1 984); Dominguez v. Cruz, 6 1 7 P.2d 1 322 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1980); Marone v. Marone, 4 1 3 N.E.2d 1 1 54 (N.Y. 1980). The Alexander
court held that if a remedy is to be given to a surviving cohabitant in the absence
of an express contract, "the Legislature should provide the remedy." See also
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closed the door to plaintiffs without an express written con
tract.1 1 3 The advantage of such a bright-line test, especially the
one that insists on an express written contract, is that it in
troduces an element of efficiency into the law similar to the effi
ciency accruing from grounding spousal rights on status. 1 14 The
domestic partner with a contract can claim the contractual rights
without having to prove anything about the underlying details or
commitment of the relationship. Just as the marriage certificate
qualifies the spouse for what the law allows, the written contract
qualifies the domestic partner-plaintiff for what the contract
allows.
The disadvantage is that plaintiffs with just claims are shut out.
This category includes plaintiffs who are in a "subordinate" posi
tion to the defendant in terms of bargaining power, and hence are
unable to obtain contractual protection. This category also in
cludes plaintiffs who are unsophisticated in the ways of the law,
the underclass, for want of a better term.
To its credit, the court in the Marvin case thought that there
would be cases that warranted relief even without a contract, and
however you feel about the morality of these arrangements, there
are cases in which the plaintiff's claim seems undeniably just. In
seeking to find a way of analyzing this problem, the court in Mar
vin used an interesting phrase. The court spoke, and spoke re
peatedly, of enforcing the "reasonable expectations of the
Carnes v. Sheldon, 3 1 1 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. Ct. App. 1 9 8 1 ) (although prior Mich
igan cases have held that express contracts are enforceable to the extent they are
based on independent consideration, and have enforced contracts implied in fact
for wages or for the value of commercial services, the court in the instant case
was "unwilling to extend equitable principles to the extent plaintiff would have
us do, since recovery based on principles of contracts implied in law essentially
would resurrect the old common-law marriage doctrine which was specifically
abolished by the Legislature. . . . [J]udicial restraint requires that the Legislature,
rather than the judiciary, is the appropriate forum for addressing the question
raised by plaintiff. We believe a contrary ruling would contravene the public pol
icy of this state 'disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to
knowingly unmarried cohabitants.' ").
1 1 3. See supra note 103.
1 14. See text accompanying note 93, supra.
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parties." "The courts may inquire into the conduct of the par
ties 1 1 5 to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an im
plied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint
venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties,"
the court said.
In speaking of the "reasonable expectations of the parties"
plural - the court was probably knowingly engaging in a fiction.
Few could doubt that the parties in the Marvin case did not enter
or continue the arrangement with the same expectations. Some
interesting empirical research has shown that different expecta
tions are standard. The study found:
-

In 39 percent of the cases for which we have couple data, one party
believes they will marry and the other does not! This difference of
perception is surely a factor in the higher instability of these unions.
Another 1 1 percent agree that they will not get married, making
just about half of all cohabiting couples where there is disagreement
about marriage or no plans to marry. Twenty-nine percent agree
that they have definite plans to marry, and in another 20 percent of
the cases one partner has definite plans to marry, while the other
thinks they will marry but does not have definite plans to do so. 1 1 6

To be sure, this study reports on marriage expectations in shorter
term cohabitations, and the Marvin court's emphasis was on a
different type of expectation - the expectation that there will be
"profit-sharing." To be sure, also, our emphasis is on the longer
term, marriage-like cohabitations, those that are the exception
overall but tend to accumulate in the population. In any event,
Lee Marvin and Michelle Triola, it would probably be safe to
speculate, did not share the same expectations, not even when
1 1 5. According to Professor Glendon, the reference to an inquiry into the
conduct of the parties raised "the prospect of litigation in which the private lives
of the parties can be explored in detail [and] has led already to the settlement out
of court of a number of suits by alleged same-sex lovers or clandestine playmates
of well-known people." M. Glendon, supra note 39, at 279.
1 1 6. Bumpass, Sweet & Cherlin, supra note 94, at 14. See also Rindfuss &
VandenHeuvel, Cohabitation: Precursor to Marriage or an Alternative to Being
Single, 1 6 Population & Dev. Rev. 703, 721 ( 1990) (empirical study finding that
"cohabitors are substantially more similar [in their attitudes toward matters such
as marriage and childbearing plans] to the singles than to the married.").
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entering into or during the happy periods of their arrangement.
Michelle probably hoped and maybe even expected that Lee
would eventually marry her or, failing that, that he would "do
right" by her financially. Whether Lee ever intended to do either
is unclear. He certainly determined never to give her a dime
shortly after they broke up.
So, what do we make of the court's emphasis on "the reason
able expectations of the parties"? The court could be saying one
of two things. One is that there should be in inquiry into whether
the defendant's behavior reasonably led the plaintiff to think that
he had the same expectations she did, i. e. , whether the defendant
led her on. The other, more significant possibility is that the
court is saying that it will attribute or impute "reasonable" expec
tations even when they are fictional regarding one of the parties.
Although this latter idea came to nothing in the Marvin case
itself, 1 1 7 some courts, in later cases, have begun to apply this idea.
Case authority is beginning to appear in which marriage-like co
habitation relationships are held to have the same force and effect
as a legal marriage. 1 18 Many if not all of these cases involve rela
tionships that would be common-law marriages 1 1 9 but for the ab1 17 . On remand, Michelle failed to prove the existence of an express or im
plied contract, but the trial court awarded her $ 1 04,000 for rehabilitation on the
ground of an unspecified equitable theory. On appeal, the judgment granting this
award was reversed for want of a "recognized underlying obligation in law or in
equity." Marvin v. Marvin, 1 22 Cal. App. 3d 8 7 1 , 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 ( 1 98 1).
See also Taylor v. Polackwich, 145 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 194 Cal. Rptr. 8 ( 1983)
("rehabilitative award" reversed on appeal).
1 1 8. For examples of cases providing for equitable division of property ac
quired while the couple cohabited before marrying or acquired while the couple
cohabited after having divorced each other, see Eaton v. Johnson, 10 Fam. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1094 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So.2d 872
(Miss. 1 986); Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1 984).
1 1 9. The requirements necessary to establish a common-law marriage vary
somewhat from state to state, but have been summarized as follows:
The jurisdictions which recognize common law marriages all require that
the parties presently agree to enter into the relationship of husband and
wife. Most jurisdictions also require cohabitation, or actually and openly
living together as husband and wife. . . . Some jurisdictions further require
that the parties hold themselves out to the world as husband and wife, and
acquire a reputation as a married couple. However, other jurisdictions hold
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olition o f that doctrine. 1 20 I'll give you two examples. 1 2 1 The
first is Goode v. Goode, 122 a recent West Virginia case. Carl and
Martha Goode separated after having lived together for 28 years.
Although the couple had never formally married, they had con
stantly held themselves out to the public as husband and wife.
that cohabitation and reputation are not requirements of a valid common
law marriage, but solely matters of evidence.
Under all of these definitions, evidence that the parties have stated "We're
not married, we're just living together" will destroy the claim of a common
law marriage.
Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheri
tance Within the Nontraditional Family, 24 Idaho L. Rev. 353, 361 ( 1987).
120. Most states have abolished common-law marriage by statute. See, e.g. ,
Mich. Comp. Laws § 5 5 1 .2. As of 1987, only thirteen states (Alabama, Colorado,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Texas) and the District of Columbia still recognized
the concept. H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations § 2.4 (2d ed. 1 987).
Negative judicial and legislative reaction to the concept of common-law mar
riage grew during the late nineteenth century. One criticism of the concept was
that the informality of common-law marriages makes them highly vulnerable to
fraud and peijury. More prominent was the argument that common-law mar
riage undermined the sanctity of marriage. See, e.g. , Sorenson v. Sorenson, 100
N.W. 930, 932 (Neb. 1 904). See generally M. Grossberg, Governing the Hearth:
Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America ( 1985).
In some states where common-law marriage has been abolished, courts have
applied a de facto common-law marriage doctrine to couples who lived together
in a common-law marriage state. In Kellard v. Kellard, 1 3 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1 987), a New York man and woman, unmarried but cohab
iting with one another, took an automobile trip to Disney World in 1978. During
the trip, they stayed overnight in a motel in South Carolina where they registered
as husband and wife, and engaged in sexual intercourse. They also stayed for
two nights in a motel in Georgia. Some years later, in defense to a divorce suit
filed in New York by the woman, the man claimed that no divorce was necessary
because he was not married to the plaintiff. A New York court rejected his de
fense, holding that the couple's behavior enroute to Disney World satisfied the
common-law marriage requirements of South Carolina and Georgia. This, along
with the lengthy history of the couple's relationship, led the court to recognize
them as married. See also Taylor, Increased Mobility Adds to Common Law
Claims, Nat'! L.J., Aug. 1 4, 1989, at 24.
1 2 1 . Other post-Marvin cases have asserted claims based on nonfamily doc
trines, such as express contract, contract implied in fact, contract implied in law,
quantum meruit, and constructive trust. See, e.g. , Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d
303 (Wis. 1 987). Decisions in many of these cases are ambiguous as to whether
the court based recovery on a contract implied in fact or on unjust enrichment
grounds.
122. 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1 990).
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They had four children. Martha, age 47, filed a divorce action
against Carl, age 6 1, seeking an equitable division of the property
they had acquired during their 28-year period of cohabitation.
Although West Virginia is not a common-law marriage state, the
court held that Martha could recover, saying:
[W]e hold that a court may order a division of property acquired
by a man and woman who are unmarried cohabitants, but who have
considered themselves and held themselves out to be husband and
wife. Such order may be based upon principles of contract, either
express or implied, or upon a constructive trust. Factors to be con
sidered in ordering such a division of property may include: the
purpose, duration, and stability of the relationship and the expecta
tions of the parties. Provided, however, that if either the man or
woman is validly married to another person during the period of
cohabitation, the property rights of the spouse and support rights of
the children of such man or woman shall not in any way be ad
versely affected by such division of property. 1 2 3 The expectations
of the parties under these circumstances would be equitable treat
ment by the other party in exchange for engaging in such a cohab
iting relationship.

My second example is a case that goes even farther and allows
an unmarried plaintiff to utilize the divorce laws directly. That
case is a Washington case, Warden v. Warden. 1 24 Charles War
den and Denise Boursier began living together in 1963, holding
themselves out as husband and wife. They had two children. In
1972, Charles moved to California and formally married another
woman. After learning of this, Denise brought suit under the di
vorce laws for child support and an equitable division of property,
which the trial court awarded. Charles appealed that part of the
1 23. Under the facts of this case, the parties Jived together for an extended
period of time, considered themselves as husband and wife, and, in fact, pooled
their resources to include taking property under three joint deeds. Therefore, in
this case, the equities are more easily determined than in a relationship between
two parties which was for a shorter duration, or where the parties did not con
sider themselves to be husband and wife, or where the parties did not pool their
resources. Cases in other jurisdictions have noted that "[e]ach case should be
assessed on its own merits with consideration given to the purpose, duration and
stability of the relationship and the expectations of the parties." Hay v. Hay, 1 00
Nev. 1 96, 1 99, 678 P.2d 672, 674 ( 1 984). [Footnote b y the court.]
124. 676 P.2d 1 037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1 984).
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judgment decreeing a division of the property. Although Wash
ington is not a common-law marriage state, the Washington
Court of Appeals affirmed, saying:
We believe the time has come for the provision of [the Washington
statute providing for equitable division of property upon dissolution
of a marriage] to govern the disposition of the property acquired by
a man and a woman who have lived together and established a rela
tionship which is tantamount to a marital family except for a legal
marriage.
The trial judge here properly treated Denise and Charles as a
marital family and correctly considered the length and purpose of
their relationship, the two children, the contributions of the parties,
and the future prospects of each. He correctly assumed that both
Denise and Charles contributed to the acquisition of the property
and divided it in a manner which was "just and equitable after con
5
sidering all relevant factors. " l 2

If the plaintiff in this case could utilize the divorce laws to gain a
share of the "marital" property, surely a similarly situated plain
tiff could gain an intestate share of the defendant's estate and,
since Washington is a community-property states, claim her half
of the "community property."
If the law begins to grant extra-contractual rights to disap
pointed domestic partners, does this mean that the law is edging
toward granting rights based on "status"? The answer appears to
be both Yes and No. To the extent that rights are granted with
out having been explicitly bargained for, yes it seems that rights
are being granted on the basis of status. Unlike marital status or
contractual status, however, each litigated cohabitation must be
probed in order to classify it as marriage-like or non-marriage
like to determine whether relief is warranted. Each plaintiff must
prove that the underlying nature of his or her relationship with
the defendant warrants recovery, that the relationship fits within
the criteria of a marriage-like cohabitation. The extract quoted
from the Warden opinion gives some idea of what must be
proved. Another definition comes from the recent New York
1 25. Jd. at 1039- 40.
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case of Brasehi v. Stahl Associates Co. , 1 26 a case that involved an
analogous question under the New York rent control laws: There
must be, the court said:
an objective examination of the relationship of the parties[, includ
ing] the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of
emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the par
ties have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to
society, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily family
services. . . . These factors are most helpful, although it should be
emphasized that the presence or absence of one or more of them is
not dispositive since it is the totality of the relationship as evidenced
by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties which
should, in the final analysis, controi. 1 27

The question these cases leave us with is: Are we obliged to
continue resolving these issues inefficiently, on a case-by-case ba
sis? We may be for a time, perhaps quite a long time, but eventu
ally there will be pressure to minimize case-by-case adjudication
by opening up more efficient, bright-line tests into which most
plaintiffs with just claims could fit automatically. I would like to
offer a couple of tentative ideas.
One possibility is to consider enacting legislation along the
lines of a New Hampshire statute. In codifying a statutory ver
sion of common-law marriage, New Hampshire introduced a
three-year bright-line rule. That legislation provides:
Cohabitation, etc. Persons cohabiting and acknowledging each
other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the
period of 3 years, and until the decease of one of them, shall there
after be deemed to have been legally married. 1 2 8

There is no magic in three years, of course, though that seems a
decent compromise. ' 29
126. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
127. /d. at 55. See also Truethart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of
"Family, " 26 Gonzaga L. Rev. 9 1 ( 1 990/9 1).
128. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:39.
129. Remember, though, that only about 10% of cohabiting couples remain
together beyond five years, and so a five-year requirement might be given
consideration.
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Another opportunity, not mutually exclusive with a fixed-time
rule, would arise if domestic-partnership registration legislation
should become state law. Ordinances in a number of municipali
ties have set up domestic partnership registries. In some munici
palities, registration has no legal effect whatever, whereas in
others it has the effect of extending the same employee benefits,
such as health insurance, to the domestic partners of registering
city employees that are extended to spouses of city employees. 1 30
Extending this type of legislation to the state level is likely to be
very controversial. 131 Should it come about, however, the legisla
tion need not and hopefully will not attribute martial status to
those who register, although that would be a possibility. Another
approach would be to provide registrants with an optional check
off system that would serve as a written contract. The registering
partners could be given the opportunity to check off whether or
not they want to be treated as if they were married for purposes
of divorce, intestacy, and elective-share or community law, or to
opt for some other system for regulating their financial affairs.
The more the law can do to encourage and facilitate written con
tracts, the more efficient the system will become.
Other creative measures may also come to light to handle this
thorny question in the near term and beyond. The area certainly
cries out for more efficient solutions than we now have.
1 30. See Truethart, supra note 1 27, at 101-05.
13 I . See, e.g., Unmarried-Partners ' Rights Test Those of Washington, N.Y.
Times, March 10, 1992, at A 1 3, describing a brewing controversy about a domes
tic-partnership ordinance recently passed by the City Council of the District of
Columbia. The ordinance, called the Health Care Benefits Expansion Act, enti
tles registering District employees to add their domestic partners to their health
insurance coverage and provides a tax benefit to private companies that expand
health benefits to domestic partners of registering employees.
Congress reviews and can repeal District of Columbia ordinances. Some mem
bers of the House District of Columbia Committee have expressed opposition to
the ordinance on the ground that it undermines the traditional family.
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CONCLUSION
Spousal rights are in a state of transition, but the directional
trends seem clear and you, as ACTEC members, can help speed
the process along by working in your state for legislative reform.
I would urge you to take a close look at the spouse's intestate
share and, in title-based states, the spouse's elective share.
In intestacy, the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction rather than the
straight fractional-share approach for marriages in which there
are step children is the only way of granting economic security to
a surviving spouse who is beyond working years, as most are,
before the estate gets divided between the spouse and children.
In the title-based states, adoption of the community-property
system would be ideal. In the meantime, attention should be
given to the elective share, for the partnership approach is an idea
whose time has surely come. It needs to be implemented and
joined with a minimum support element. It also needs to be
backed up with an augmented-estate concept, so that evasion by
will substitute is curtailed.
Both these intestacy and elective-share features have already
been worked out in fine detail and converted to statutory lan
guage in the 1990 revisions of the Uniform Probate Code. If
study of those revisions is not yet underway in your state, I urge
you to take steps to get that study process going. Finally, as that
process does get underway, I recognize that it is inevitable that
questions will arise. When and if they do, please contact me or a
member of the Joint Editorial Board for assistance. We are
happy to help in any way we can, in explaining the theory of any
provision, what it means, or how it fits together with other provi
sions to form a coherent whole. Opening up lines of communica
tion between us and your state study committee can only be
beneficial to the ultimate improvement of the law.

